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     This study examined object permanence in Sumatran orangutans (Pongo abelii), 
Western lowland gorillas (Gorilla gorilla gorilla), and black-and-white-ruffed lemurs 
(Varecia variegata) at Zoo Atlanta. Object permanence has been defined as the 
understanding that objects continue to exist even they are not perceived-- when this 
understanding is fully developed, individuals are able to represent the unperceived 
trajectory of objects. Object permanence is necessary for many species to efficiently 
forage for hidden food and to locate moving prey, predators, or group members. Object 
permanence has been extensively studied in humans, as well as several non-human 
species: various primate species, dogs, cats, and birds.  
     A literature review reveals two main issues with object permanence research in non-
human primates. One of the issues is that it is difficult to make valid comparisons 
between different species because very few studies have been conducted using 
appropriate controls. Thus, one of the goals of this study was to conduct control trials for 
all tasks in the traditional object permanence test battery, in order to reliably assess and 
compare performance in the species under study. The second issue is concerned with the 
finding that all of the non-human primate species tested so far have failed one of the more 
difficult tasks in the test battery, namely the non-adjacent double invisible displacement 
task. It has been hypothesized that this performance limitation is a result of the manner in 
which the task is presented. Thus, the second goal of this study was to modify the 
existing methodology and present the task to gorillas and orangutans in locomotive space 
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to see if performance improves. This is the first study to present this task to non-human 
primate species in locomotive space.   
     This study found that orangutans were the only species to reliably pass most tasks in 
the traditional object permanence test battery. Black-and-white ruffed lemurs failed most 
visible and invisible displacement tasks. Owing to the small sample size of gorillas in this 
study, further research is required before any firm conclusions can be made about the 
ability of this species to solve visible and invisible displacement tasks in the traditional 
object permanence test battery. Presenting the boxes in locomotive space to gorillas and 
orangutans did not improve performance on the non-adjacent double invisible 
displacement task. Further research is required to resolve the question of whether this 
performance limitation is a result of the manner in which the task was presented.  
     A third goal of this dissertation was to try and ensure that no simple search strategies 
could account for success in solving the tasks in the traditional test battery. Some 
previous studies have controlled for strategies such as “search in the last box visited by 
the experimenter” and “search in the first box visited by the experimenter.” While the 
present study also controlled for these strategies, I found that subjects could appear to 
succeed on some tasks by using a strategy of “randomly choosing between the two boxes 
visited by the experimenter.” This finding warrants a re-evaluation of object permanence 
in all species studied to date. Future studies of object permanence in non-human primates 










     Jean Piaget (1952, 1954) defined object permanence as the understanding that objects 
continue to exist even they are not perceived. He claimed that this understanding 
develops in stages in children during the first two years of life, and when this 
understanding is fully developed, children are able to represent the unperceived trajectory 
of objects. 
     According to Piaget, object permanence starts to develop when the infant is between 4 
to 8 months of age, and is fully developed by the time the infant is between 18 to 24 
months of age. Piaget divided the developmental process of object permanence itself into 
six stages. During the first two stages (birth to 4 months), human infants do not search for 
objects that have disappeared. During the third stage (4 to 8 months), infants can recover 
a partially occluded object, although there is no systematic search for completely hidden 
objects. During the fourth stage (8-12 months), they can recover a completely hidden 
object, but only if they start grasping at it at the time it disappears (Stage 4a); and later 
(Stage 4b), they can find a hidden object without the initial grasping motion. But infants 
commit the so-called “A-not-B error” (or perseveration error) by searching for the object 
in the location where it was previously retrieved from successfully.   
     During Stage 5 (12-18 months), infants no longer commit the A-not-B error (Stage 
5a); they can also find an object that has been successively hidden behind different 
occluders within the same trial (Stage 5b). During Stage 6 (18-24 months), infants start 
solving invisible displacements (in which the movement of the object is not visible). 
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Piaget claimed that individuals who attain stage 4 understand that an object continues to 
exist even when it is not perceived; individuals who attain stage 5 are capable of tracking 
an object that is successively visibly displaced behind different occluders; and individuals 
who attain stage 6 are capable of representing the unperceived trajectory of an object.  
 
Object Permanence Research in Humans 
     Piaget’s stage theory was based on informal testing of his own children. Early 
researchers of object permanence in human infants standardized these informal tests (for 
instance, Gratch, 1977; Harris, 1975; Schuberth, 1983; Sophian, 1985; Sophian & Sage, 
1983; Uzgiris & Hunt, 1975). These early studies usually involved hiding an object 
behind/under one of a few hiding locations (screens or boxes), and allowing infants to 
make a search response.            
     Using this method, researchers found evidence to support Piaget’s stage theory of 
object permanence development. One of the main findings was in support of Piaget’s 
claim that infants attain the fourth stage by about 9 months of age. But, results from the 
seminal study conducted by Baillargeon, Spelke, and Wasserman (1985) revealed that 
infants as young as 5 months of age might be attaining the fourth stage of object 
permanence. Baillargeon et al. (1985) argued that a Piagetian search task was too difficult 
for very young infants; instead of reflecting “limited competence” to solve stage 4 tasks, 
the difficulty of Piaget’s tasks reflected “performance limitations” because of the need to 
coordinate separate actions toward separate objects (means-end sequences). That is, 
infants could not solve the tasks because they could not physically retrieve the object 
with the necessary coordinated limb movements (which apparently develop only when 
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infants have reached around 9 months of age). Thus, the experiments conducted by 
Baillargeon et al. (1985) used the violation-of-expectation (VOE) paradigm, which did 
not require infants to perform actions; it relied on looking-times, instead. Infants were 
habituated to a screen that rotated back and forth through a 180 degree arc. Then, a box 
was placed behind the screen, and the infants saw two events: 1. the screen rotated until it 
reached the hidden box, and then came back (expected event); 2. the screen rotated 
through a full 180 degree arc as though the box was absent (unexpected event). The 
infants looked longer at the unexpected event, which was taken to indicate that they 
possessed some understanding that objects continue to exist even when they cannot be 
perceived, and so were “surprised” at the unexpected event.  
     Researchers using the VOE paradigm have repeatedly found that infants as young as 3 
to 4 months of age attain the fourth stage of object permanence (Aguiar & Baillargeon, 
2002; Baillargeon, 1987; Baillargeon, 1993; Baillargeon & Graber, 1987; Kellman & 
Spelke, 1983; Luo, Baillargeon, Brueckner, Munakata, 2003; Ruffman, Slade, & 
Redman, 2005; Spelke, Breinlinger, Macomber, and Jacobson, 1992; Spelke & Hespos, 
2001). However, this claim has been disputed by several researchers (Bogartz & 
Shinskey, 1998; Bogartz, Shinskey, & Speaker, 1997; Haith, 1988; Meltzoff & Moore, 
1998; Moore & Meltzoff, 1999; Munakata, 2001; Munakata, McClelland, Johnson, & 
Siegler, 1997; Schlesinger & Casey, 2003; Thelen, Schoner, Scheier, & Smith, 2001). 
     More recently, some researchers have suggested that object permanence is innate 
(Baillargeon, 2008; Spelke, 2007), while others have argued that it is acquired over time 
(Cohen, Chaput, & Cashon, 2002; Mareschal, Johnson, Sirois, Spratling, Thomas, & 
Westermann, 2007). Other areas of recent research on object permanence in humans 
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include studies on variables (such as object boundaries and proximity relations) that 
affect children’s search for hidden objects (Shutts, Keen, & Spelke, 2006), permanence 
for moving objects (Bremner, Johnson, Slater, Mason, Foster, Cheshire, & Spring, 2005), 
permanence for familiar versus novel objects (Shinskey & Munakata, 2005), infants’ 
search for hidden persons (Krojgaard, 2005), and search for hidden objects in the dark 
(Shinskey, 2008; Shinskey & Munakata, 2003).  
    
Object Permanence Research in Animals 
     Early researchers used tasks that were developed for human infants (for instance, 
Uzgiris & Hunt, 1975) to test for object permanence in animals. The tasks were modified, 
however, to suit the characteristics of different species. These early studies usually 
involved hiding an object behind/under one of two to five hiding locations (screens or 
boxes), and allowing the subject to make a search response. A series of visible and 
invisible search tasks were administered. Visible tasks are those in which the subject can 
see the movement of the object in between the hiding locations because the 
experimenter’s open hand or a transparent “displacer” is used to move the object. 
Invisible tasks are those in which the subject cannot see the object moving in between the 
hiding locations because an opaque displacer is used to move the object. Visible and 
invisible tasks consist of either single displacements (in which the object is moved 
behind/under one hiding location, and left there), or double displacements (in which the 
object is moved behind/under two hiding locations in succession, before being left at the 
second location). Success on single visible displacement tasks is taken as evidence of an 
understanding that an object exists even when it is not perceived. Success on double 
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visible displacement tasks is taken as evidence of an ability to track a visibly moving 
object. Success on invisible displacement tasks is taken as evidence of an ability to 
represent the unperceived trajectory of an object.  
 
Object Permanence Research in Birds, Cats, and Dogs 
     Using the method described above, researchers have found that the following non-
primate species can solve visible displacement tasks: ring doves (Dumas & Wilkie, 
1995), kakarikis (Funk, 1996), magpies (Pollok, Prior, & Gunturkun, 2000), domestic 
cats (Dore, 1986, 1990; Dumas, 1992; Dumas & Dore, 1989, 1991; Goulet, Dore, & 
Rosseau 1994), and dogs (Triana & Pasnak, 1981). It has also been found that visible and 
invisible displacement tasks can be solved by psittacine birds (Funk, 1996; Pepperberg & 
Funk, 1990; Pepperberg & Kozak, 1986, Pepperberg, Willner, & Gravitz, 1997). Until 
very recently, it was thought that dogs could also solve invisible displacements (Gagnon 
& Dore, 1992; 1993; 1994; Watson, Gergely, Csanyi, Topal, Gacsi, & Sarkozi, 2001). 
However, rigorously controlled studies on dogs by Collier-Baker, Davis, and Suddendorf 
(2004), and Fiset and LeBlanc (2007) have proved otherwise, thus calling into question 
the earlier results with psittacine birds too. 
 
Object Permanence Research in Non-Human Primates 
     Formal research on object permanence in non-human primates began during the 1970s 
(see Tomasello & Call, 1997, for a review). Object permanence in non-human primates is 
studied under the realm of “physical cognition,” which is a term that encompasses the 
ability to find objects in large-scale and small-scale space, and to manipulate, categorize, 
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and quantify objects (Tomasello & Call, 1997). Before describing previous research on 
object permanence in non-human primates, it is important to have a brief discussion 
about theories of physical cognition that attempt to explain how cognitive skills might 
have evolved in primates as adaptations to different ecological conditions. Two major 
theories that have been proposed in the context of foraging will be discussed in the next 
section, followed by a brief discussion of Tomasello and Call’s (1997) extension of these 
theories to object permanence.  
 
Theories of Primate Physical Cognition  
     Foraging theory. Milton (1981, 1988) suggested that the type of foraging behavior 
exhibited by primates depends on their diet, and that complex cognitive skills evolved 
because of foraging demands. She notes that plant foods are a major portion of the diet of 
all extant primates, and that plant foods are patchily (not uniformly) distributed in the 
environment both spatially and temporally, but with some degree of predictability (fruits 
are more patchily distributed than leaves; different types of fruits and leaves are available 
at different times of the year). The patchiness would make it difficult for a primate to 
specialize on only a few plant species, especially given the constraints of day-range sizes 
and energy requirements. Milton hypothesized that patchiness is equivalent to foraging 
complexity, and that the complexity of cognitive skills increases with an increase in 
foraging complexity, given that patchy resources are predictable. Thus, Milton 
hypothesized that many primates might have evolved complex cognitive skills to locate 
and identify food sources. Furthermore, since tropical forest environments may change 
quickly, it would be ideal if primates were born with flexible and adaptable learning 
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skills, instead of knowledge of different kinds of food. Milton suggested a correlation 
between a species’ brain size (corrected for body size) and the patchiness of food 
resources that a species exploits, and found evidence to support this hypothesis by 
examining spider monkeys, a more frugivorous (primarily fruit-eating) species, and 
howler monkeys, a more folivorous (primarily leaf-eating) species. She found that the 
former had a larger brain size (corrected for body size) than the latter. Clutton-Brock and 
Harvey (1980) also found that frugivorous primates have larger brains (relative to body 
size) than folivorous primates.  
     Tomasello and Call (1997) describe a few problems that have been found with this 
theory. First, Byrne (1994) has argued that brain encephalization should be used as a 
measure of complex cognitive skills, instead of brain size, because body size is not 
relevant in this context. Second, Dunbar (1992, 1995) has argued against the use of day-
range size as a measure of foraging complexity, because different species might find the 
same environment to be complex in different ways, depending on body size. When he 
corrected day-range size for body size, he did not find any correlation between the 
complexity of foraging demands and “intelligence” (as measured by neocortical 
expansion).         
     Extractive foraging theory. Parker and Gibson’s (1971, 1979) theory focuses on 
“extractive foraging,” which is the process by which an animal extracts food that is not 
easily accessible from a substrate or shell (for instance, opening nuts, digging for tubers, 
looking under bark or rocks for insects, and using tools to extract insects or honey). Since 
the food is not directly perceptible, and extracting it requires complex object 
manipulation skills, Parker and Gibson hypothesized that extractive foragers must have 
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evolved complex cognitive skills, including the capacity for mental representation, for 
this purpose. They found support for this hypothesis in the observation that omnivorous 
species that are extractive foragers, and that use tools either in the wild (such as 
chimpanzees and capuchin monkeys), or in captivity (such as gorillas and orangutans), 
score high on Piagetian scales of sensory-motor intelligence. One criticism of this theory 
is that although extractive foraging is widespread among other primate and non-primate 
species, it is not always correlated with high-level performance on Piagetian scales of 
sensory-motor intelligence (Tomasello & Call, 1997).  
     Theory for the evolution of object permanence skills. Tomasello and Call (1997) 
suggested that basic skills of object permanence, with which individuals understand that 
an object continues to exist even when it is not perceived, might have very well evolved 
within the context of foraging, including extractive foraging. However, they hypothesized 
that an ability to represent the unperceived movements of objects (stage 6 invisible 
displacements) might have evolved in species that need to track mobile prey, predators, 
or group members. Most primates live in social groups; many have predators and prey on 
mobile invertebrates. Thus, Tomasello and Call hypothesize that it is not likely that too 
many differences will be found within primate species, in the domain of physical 
cognition, in general, and object permanence skills, in particular. This hypothesis has 
been supported by research on the representational abilities in monkeys and apes (see 





Findings from Object Permanence Research on Non-Human Primates 
     Early studies found that many species of monkeys and apes were capable of solving 
both visible and invisible displacement tasks. These species included squirrel monkeys 
(Vaughter, Smotherman, & Ordy, 1972), rhesus monkeys (Wise, Wise, & Zimmerman, 
1974), woolly monkeys (Mathieu, Bouchard, Granger, & Herscovitch, 1976), capuchin 
monkeys (Mathieu et al., 1976), stump-tailed macaques (Parker, 1977), gorillas 
(Redshaw, 1978), and chimpanzees (Mathieu et al., 1976; Mathieu & Bergeron, 1981; 
Wood, Moriarty, Gardner, & Gardner, 1980).  
     However, in a seminal paper that can be considered as a turning point in the history of 
the study of object permanence in non-human species, Natale, Antinucci, Spinozzi, and 
Poti (1986) argued that previous research on non-human primates could only provide 
evidence of an understanding that objects continue to exist when they are not perceived. 
It could not provide indisputable evidence of an ability to track a visibly moving object 
and to represent the unperceived trajectory of an object because the double visible and 
invisible tasks could be solved by using simple search strategies. For instance, Natale et 
al. (1986) claimed that because the object was always hidden in the last location visited 
by the experimenter, subjects could simply be using the rule “search in the last location 
visited,” thereby solving the tasks. The authors designed suitable tasks to control for this 
search strategy, while administering single invisible displacements to a juvenile gorilla 
and a Japanese macaque. Their apparatus consisted of two large boxes (the bottom side of 
each box was open in order to hide a food reward). During regular trials, the reward was 
placed in a small box (the opaque displacer), which was then moved to under one of the 
large boxes. The reward was inconspicuously left under the large box (by tilting the large 
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box in such a way as to prevent the subjects from seeing the transfer), and the small box 
was then moved to a final location (to one end of the array of large boxes). However, the 
researchers also introduced some control trials in which, after placing the reward in the 
small box, this was not moved to under a large box. Instead, the experimenter just tilted 
one of the large boxes, as done in the regular trials. The study found that while both the 
gorilla and Japanese macaque solved the regular trials, only the gorilla passed the control 
trials (that is, the Japanese macaque searched under the large box that was tilted, even 
though it had never seen the small box with the reward move under it). The authors 
concluded that administering appropriate control trials was imperative to any study of 
object permanence, and suggested that previously studied species should be re-evaluated 
with this in mind. 
     Using the same procedure that Natale et al. (1986) developed, Schino, Spinozzi, and 
Berlinguer (1990) found that capuchin monkeys and long-tailed macaques could not 
solve control invisible displacement tasks. Since the early 1990s, researchers have used a 
slightly modified version of the tasks developed by Natale et al. (1986) to test for object 
permanence in various species of non-human primates. This modified version makes use 
of three boxes (labeled A, B, C), and a displacer (a transparent one for visible tasks, and 
an opaque one for invisible tasks) to displace a food reward. Some, or all, of the  
following tasks are administered1 (Figure 1 depicts some of the tasks in this battery): 
                                                 
1
 Description of tests is adapted from de Blois, Novak, and Bond (1998). In all the tests described, after the 
reward is left in the final hiding place, the displacer is shown to be empty and moved away to a randomly 
pre-determined location (a spot on either side of the array of boxes, or a spot in between the boxes). 
Henceforth, these tests will be referred to as “regular tasks” to distinguish them from “control tasks.” 
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     Test 1: Single visible displacement. The reward is placed in a transparent displacer in 
full view of the subject. The displacer is then moved into one of the boxes, where the 
reward is left. The reward is hidden under the same box in all trials.  
     Test 2: Sequential visible displacement. After the last trial of test 1, the reward is 
hidden in a different box for a few trials (for instance, subjects that see the displacer 
being placed in box A in test 1, now see it being placed in box C, and vice versa). 
     Test 3: Alternate visible displacement. On each trial, the experimenter varies the 
location of the reward among boxes A, B, and C.  
     Test 4: Double visible displacement. Within a single trial, the displacer is moved into 
one box, removed, and then moved into a second box, where the reward is hidden. 
     Test 5: Triple visible displacement. Within a single trial, the displacer is moved into 
three boxes successively, and the reward is left under the third box. 
     Test 6: Single invisible displacement. The reward is placed in an opaque displacer in 
full view of the subject. The displacer is then moved into one of the boxes, where the 
reward is left. The reward is hidden under the same box in all trials.  
     Test 7: Sequential invisible displacement. After the last trial of test 6, the reward is 
hidden in a different box for a few trials, with the same procedure as in test 6 (for 
instance, subjects that see the displacer being placed in box A, now see it being placed in 
box C, and vice versa). 
     Test 8: Alternate invisible displacement. On each trial, the experimenter varies the 
location of the reward among boxes A, B, and C.  
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Figure 1. Depiction of some of the tasks in the battery. 
 
     Test 9: Double invisible displacement. Within a single trial, the displacer is moved 
into one box, removed, and then moved into a second box, where the reward is hidden 
(the displacer is not opened in between these two box visits). Then the displacer is 
removed, shown empty, and moved to a final pre-determined location (as in all the other 
tests). Subjects are given a second chance to look for the reward if their first choice 
involves the first box visited (but not baited) by the experimenter; if not, the trial ends at 
once (this is the only task in which subjects are allowed two chances). 
 Single visible displacement 
 Single invisible displacement 
Double visible adjacent 
Double invisible non-adjacent 
 
    Subject does not know whether reward  
    was left under A or under C. Displacer  
     is shown empty only at the very end. 
A               B               C 
A               B               C 
A               B               C 




Displacer is shown as empty at the end 
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     Researchers administering this entire test battery have also used some control trials to 
control for the “search in the last location visited” strategy in the following species: 
rhesus monkeys (de Blois & Novak, 1994), orangutans (de Blois et al., 1998), cotton-top 
tamarins (Neiworth, Steinmark, Basile, Wonders, Steely, & DeHart, 2003), and common 
marmosets (Mendes & Huber, 2004). After administering all the visible tasks in the test 
battery, these researchers included some control trials in which: the reward is placed in a 
transparent displacer which is moved into one box, removed, and then moved into a 
second box, where the reward is hidden. After the displacer is shown empty, it is moved 
into a third box, before being placed in a final pre-determined location (this can be 
labeled as a double visible displacement control because the empty transparent displacer 
is moved into a third box, after the reward is hidden in the second box). Some of these 
researchers also included some control trials after administering all the invisible tasks in 
the test battery as follows: 
1. The reward is placed in an opaque displacer which is moved into one box, 
removed, and then moved into a second box, where the reward is hidden. After 
the displacer is shown empty, it is moved into a third box, before being placed in 
a final pre-determined location (rhesus monkeys-- de Blois & Novak, 1994; 
marmosets-- Mendes & Huber, 2004). This can be labeled as a double invisible 
displacement control (see explanation above).  
2. The reward is placed in an opaque displacer. The displacer is moved into one box 
where the reward is hidden. Then the displacer is shown empty and moved into a 
second box, before being placed in a final pre-determined location (orangutans-- 
de Blois et al., 1998; tamarins-- Neiworth et al., 2003). This can be labeled as a 
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single invisible displacement control because the empty opaque displacer is 
moved into a second box, after the reward is hidden in the first box. 
     Thus, a single block of control trials was administered for all visible tasks combined, 
as well as all invisible tasks combined, instead of control trials after each and every task 
in the test battery. Moreover, as can be seen from the above description, one kind of 
invisible displacement control was used in two studies, and another kind was used in the 
other two studies (as will be explained later, to make proper comparisons across species, 
it would be better to standardize the methodology in such a way as to administer control 
trials for each and every task in the battery, and to label each control task in the manner 
described above, to avoid any confusion). 
     The rhesus monkeys, orangutans, and tamarins tested with the test battery were found 
to successfully solve all visible tasks-- both regular and control trials (marmosets failed 
visible controls, but passed the regular trials). 
     Results were mixed when invisible tasks were considered: rhesus monkeys failed all 
invisible tasks, including controls (de Blois & Novak, 1994). Marmosets failed sequential 
and double invisible displacements, but passed single and alternate (Mendes & Huber, 
2004). Neiworth et al. (2003) claimed that cotton-top tamarins solved all invisible tasks 
(except for the single invisible controls). However, owing to some methodological 
differences in their study (the displacer was opened in between box visits in their double 
invisible displacement task, thus rendering it a single displacement), other researchers 
have questioned the validity of these findings (for instance, Fedor, Skollar, Szerencsy, & 
Ujhelyi, 2008).  
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     Orangutans solved all invisible tasks (including the single invisible controls), except 
for the double invisible displacements (de Blois et al., 1998). When analyzing double 
invisible displacements, the authors made a distinction between two types of 
displacements. In adjacent displacements, the displacer visits two adjacent boxes in 
succession (for instance, AB, BA, BC, CB), before being placed in its final position. In 
non-adjacent displacements, the displacer visits two non-adjacent boxes in succession 
(for instance AC or CA), before being placed in its final position. De Blois et al. (1998) 
found that orangutans passed the adjacent trials, but not the non-adjacent trials, which 
resulted in the overall finding of a failure in the double invisible displacement task.  
     Not all researchers have made use of all the tests in the battery described previously. 
Call (2001) used alternate visible, double visible, alternate invisible, and double invisible 
tasks to test for object permanence in orangutans and chimpanzees. He did not administer 
any control trials. However, the manner in which he conducted the double visible and 
double invisible tasks eliminated any need for controls for the double displacements. 
Unlike most other researchers who always left the reward under the second box visited 
during double displacements, Call alternated the hiding location between the first and 
second boxes visited. This not only controlled for the use of the strategy “search in the 
last location visited,” but also controlled for the use of another strategy, namely “search 
in the first location visited.” His study replicated the de Blois et al. (1998) finding—
subjects passed all tasks except for non-adjacent double invisible displacement trials. 
Similar results were obtained in a study by Barth and Call (2006), who used single and 
double invisible displacements to test for object permanence in chimpanzees, bonobos, 
orangutans, and gorillas. All species solved all tasks, except for non-adjacent double 
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invisible displacement trials. As in Call (2001), the authors did not administer any control 
trials. However, as explained above, the manner in which they conducted the double 
invisible displacement tasks eliminated any need for controls for that task. Similar results 
were also obtained in a study by Collier-Baker and Suddendorf (2006), who used double 
invisible displacements to test for object permanence in chimpanzees in the same manner 
as Call (2001).  
     Another study in which all tasks were not used was conducted by Collier-Baker, 
Davis, Nielson, and Suddendorf (2006), who used single invisible displacements to test 
for object permanence in chimpanzees. They administered specific control trials to 
control for the use of both the “last location visited” and “first location visited” strategies, 
and found that their subjects successfully solved all control tasks.  
     In a more recent study, Fedor et al. (2008) tested various species of gibbons on single 
visible, single invisible, and double invisible tasks, using just single invisible controls. 
Owing to the high individual variability found across all tasks, and some evidence of the 
use of various search strategies, the authors cautioned that more studies need to be 
conducted before any conclusion can be drawn about gibbons as a species. 
     In sum, research to date indicates that visible displacement tasks with some form of 
control can be solved by two great ape species-- orangutans (Call, 2001; de Blois et al., 
1998) and chimpanzees (Call, 2001), and two monkey species-- rhesus monkeys (de 
Blois & Novak, 1994) and cotton-top tamarins (Neiworth et al., 2003). Research also 
indicates that several invisible displacement tasks with some form of control can be 
solved by great apes (results are unclear in studies of monkeys): orangutans (Barth & 
Call, 2006; Call, 2001; de Blois et al., 1998), chimpanzees (Barth & Call, 2006; Call, 
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2001; Collier-Baker et al., 2006), and bonobos and gorillas (Barth & Call, 2006). 
However, using the methods described, no great ape species has been found to solve non-
adjacent double invisible displacement trials (hypothesized reasons for failure will be 
discussed in detail in another section). 
     Although research on object permanence in non-human primates has come a long 
way, there is still a need for more studies to be conducted using monkeys, apes, and 
prosimians for the following reasons: 
1. Very few studies using appropriate controls have been conducted (only one study 
with most species: bonobos, gibbons, gorillas, rhesus monkeys, and cotton-top 
tamarins; three studies with orangutans and chimpanzees) 
2. Only four studies have used all the tasks in the test battery (de Blois & Novak, 
1994; de Blois et al., 1998; Mendes & Huber, 2004; Neiworth et al., 2003). 
Gorillas, bonobos, and gibbons have never been tested on visible displacement 
tasks with suitable controls.  
3. None of the studies conducted so far have used control trials for each and every 
task in the test battery, which is something that needs to be done in order to gain a 
more thorough understanding of object permanence in non-human primates, and 
in order to be able to make valid species comparisons (Collier-Baker et al., 2006). 
4. Different studies have used different kinds of control trials, which makes it very 
difficult to draw valid species comparisons (that is, some studies have used only 
single invisible controls, while other studies have used only double invisible 
controls).  
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5. Although some studies have controlled for search strategies such as “last box 
visited” and “first box visited”, researchers have admitted that subjects might be 
succeeding in some tasks by using yet other simple strategies (Collier-Baker et al., 
2006; Fedor et al., 2008). If other strategies are found, it will warrant a re-
evaluation of all species studied to date.  
     Thus, one of the goals of this dissertation was to test different primate species on all 
tasks in the object permanence test battery, using controls for every task in the battery 
(such a standardized methodology will yield valid species comparisons). Another goal 
was to ensure that no other simple search strategy could account for success in solving 
the tasks (please see next section for a description of one possible strategy that no other 
researchers seem to have taken into account).  
 
Strategy of Randomly Choosing Between the Two Visited Boxes 
     In all the regular tasks of the test battery described in the previous section, the reward 
was always hidden in the last location visited by the experimenter. Thus, subjects could 
simply be using the rule-- “search in the last location visited,” to solve the tasks. As 
described previously, an appropriate control for all the regular tasks in which a single 
displacement is made would be: move the displacer into one box where the reward is 
hidden, show the displacer as empty, and then move the empty displacer into a second 
box, before placing it in a final pre-determined location. This can be labeled as a single 
displacement control because the empty displacer is moved into a second box, after the 
reward is hidden in the first box (single visible displacement control if a transparent 
displacer is used, and single invisible displacement control if an opaque displacer is 
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used). If subjects pass both regular and control tasks, then it can be concluded that the 
tasks were solved without the use of the strategy “search in the last location visited.” 
     For single displacements, previous researchers have analyzed both regular and control 
tasks as follows. The actual number of correct choices made by the subject was compared 
with the number expected if the subject were randomly choosing one box out of three 
(the probability of succeeding by doing this is 0.33). If there was no significant 
difference, then it was concluded that the subject failed the tasks. If the number of correct 
choices was significantly higher than the expected number (that is, if performance was 
“above chance”), then it was concluded that the subject passed the tasks (and in 
particular, solved the tasks without the use of a strategy of “search in the last location 
visited”).  
     While this is an accurate method of analyzing performance on regular tasks (where 
one box is visited by the experimenter), I have found that the analysis for control tasks is 
incomplete (in control tasks for single displacements, two boxes are visited by the 
experimenter). In control tasks, if the number of correct choices is significantly higher 
than the number expected if the subject were randomly choosing one box out of three, we 
need to then verify whether the subject was using a strategy of randomly choosing 
between the two boxes visited by the experimenter (in which case, it might still appear 
that the subject is performing “above chance”). This can be done by comparing the 
number of choices to the baited box with the number of choices to the non-baited visited 
box (not using the total number of trials; only the number of trials on which the subject 
visited one of the two boxes in question; probability of chance success is then 0.5). If 
there is no significant difference, then it can be concluded that the subject has failed the 
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task. If there is a significant difference, then it can be concluded that the subject is not 
using the strategy of “randomly choosing one of the two boxes visited by the 
experimenter.” Control trials for any single displacement task (i.e., single, sequential, and 
alternate visible controls, as well as single, sequential, and alternate invisible controls) 
need to be analyzed in this manner, as do the regular trials of the double visible 
displacement task (in which, the displacer is moved into one box, removed, and then 
moved into a second box, where the reward is hidden). This kind of analysis has not been 
conducted previously, and this is the first study to do so.  
      
Hypothesized Reasons for Failure in Object Permanence Tasks 
     The main explanation that has been put forth for the finding that monkeys cannot 
solve invisible displacement tasks is that these species cannot represent the unperceived 
trajectory of an object, although they have some understanding that an object continues to 
exist in one location even if it cannot be seen (for instance, de Blois & Novak, 1994; de 
Blois et al., 1998; de Blois, Novak, & Bond, 1999).  
     The other failure that has been documented in object permanence studies has been the 
inability of all ape species to solve non-adjacent double invisible displacement trials. 
During the double invisible displacement task, an opaque displacer is moved into two 
boxes successively, and the reward is hidden under one of them (the displacer is not 
opened in between these two box visits). Then the displacer is removed, shown empty, 
and moved to a final pre-determined location. Subjects are given a second chance to look 
for the reward if their first choice involves a box visited, but not baited, by the 
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experimenter. Two kinds of displacements are possible: 1. Adjacent displacements, in 
which the displacer visits two adjacent boxes in succession (AB, BA, BC, CB), and  
2. Non-adjacent displacements, in which the displacer visits two non-adjacent boxes in 
succession (AC or CA). Apes seem to be able to solve adjacent trials, but not non-
adjacent, and the following hypotheses have been put forth to explain this finding:  
1. Apes are capable of representing the unperceived trajectory of an object, but there are 
some limits to this capacity (Call, 2001).  
2. The memory deficit hypothesis (de Blois & Novak, 1994; Gagnon & Dore, 1993): If 
the subjects’ first choice involves the first box visited (but not baited) by the 
experimenter, then they are unable to remember which box was visited next, and so 
choose the center box. However, several studies have since ruled out this hypothesis as a 
possible explanation (Barth & Call, 2006; Call, 2001; de Blois et al., 1999). 
3. The response bias-inhibition hypothesis (Call, 2001): Call found that the orangutans 
and chimpanzees he studied made second-choice errors as follows. If their first choice 
was to an unbaited visited box (which meant that they would have a second choice), they 
seemed unable to inhibit a response to the box right next to the one that they had just 
selected (the unbaited center box which was never visited by the experimenter). His 
subjects made a significantly greater percentage of second-choice errors in non-adjacent 
trials, when compared to adjacent trials. This finding led Call to hypothesize that apes 
have a bias towards searching in a sequence, with an inability to inhibit choosing the 
center box.  
     To further support his hypothesis, Call (2001) then administered some additional “no-
displacement” trials in which he baited two boxes in full view of the subjects, closed 
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them, and then allowed the subjects to make a response. He presented adjacent and non-
adjacent trials, both of which had two baited boxes, instead of the usual one baited box.  
Memory demands for both types of trials were thus the same. If the memory deficit 
hypothesis was correct, then subjects should have difficulties with both types of trials. 
However, Call found that subjects performed much better on adjacent trials. In non-
adjacent trials, subjects again seemed unable to inhibit a response to the unbaited center 
box, after having selected one of the extreme boxes. That is, they had a tendency to 
uncover boxes sequentially on double displacements, which allowed them to solve 
adjacent, but not non-adjacent trials. 
     This brings us to one of the questions that researchers are currently trying to answer. 
Are apes capable of representing the unperceived trajectory of an object, but with some 
limits to this capacity? Or are these performance limitations a result of the manner in 
which the tasks are presented? Call (2001) hypothesized that arranging the boxes so close 
together in space might be causing the response bias of searching in a sequence, with an 
inability to inhibit choosing the center box. He suggested presenting tasks in a locomotive 
(not a small-scale) space, because having to move from one location to another might 
introduce costs associated with traveling and may reduce the tendency to search in 
locations that have not been visited by the experimenter (that is, the center box). If apes 
succeed on non-adjacent double invisible displacement trials in locomotive space, it 
would confirm that they are indeed fully capable of representing the unperceived 
trajectory of an object.  
     Thus, another goal of this dissertation was to present double displacement tasks to 
gorillas and orangutans in a locomotive space, to see if they could solve non-adjacent 
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double invisible displacement trials.2 I also wanted to see if I could find support for Call’s 
(2001) response-bias inhibition hypothesis by analyzing the different types of successes 
and errors on double invisible displacements. 
 
Present Study 
Justification for Choice of Species 
     As mentioned previously, basic skills of object permanence (with which individuals 
understand that an object continues to exist even when it is not perceived), might have 
evolved within the context of foraging and extractive foraging, and the ability to 
represent the unperceived movements of objects might have evolved in species that need 
to track mobile prey, predators, or group members. Since most primates need to track 
group members, and have to forage for plant food that remains at certain a location even 
when it is not being perceived, it has been hypothesized that not too many differences 
will be found within primate species in terms of representational skills (Tomasello & 
Call, 1997), and this hypothesis has been supported by findings from several studies, at 
least, studies of monkeys and apes (see Call, 2000, for a review).  
     In order to further test this hypothesis, I chose to study species from the three major 
groups of primates: black-and-white ruffed lemurs and ring-tailed lemurs (prosimians), 
Western lowland gorillas and Sumatran orangutans (great apes), and golden lion tamarins 
(a New World monkey species). These seemed to be suitable study species because all of 
them feed on plant foods to some extent. Gorillas are folivorous, but engage in seasonal 
frugivory (Doran & McNeilage, 2001). Orangutans and black-and-white ruffed lemurs 
                                                 
2
 Tests in locomotive space were not planned for the lemurs and golden lion tamarins because their 
enclosures were not suited for the method used. 
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are mainly frugivores (Cawthon Lang, 2005; Vasey, 2003). Golden lion tamarins and 
ring-tailed lemurs are omnivores, with fruit comprising a major portion of their diet; the 
latter feed on leaves as well (Kinzey, 1997; Sauther, Sussman, & Gould, 1999). 
     All five species also need to keep track of moving group members. Ring-tailed lemurs, 
black-and-white ruffed lemurs, gorillas, and golden lion tamarins live in social groups in 
the wild (Baker, Bales, & Dietz, 2002; Doran & McNeilage, 2001; Vasey, 2003; Watts, 
1996); orangutans in the wild interact socially during breeding and when taking care of 
offspring (MacKinnon, 1974; Maple, 1980).  
     As a final note, at the time of this study, there had been no previous research 
conducted on object permanence in golden lion tamarins, ring-tailed lemurs, and black-
and-white ruffed lemurs, and one of the aims of this study was to fill this gap in the 
literature.  
 
Goals of this Dissertation 
1. Test different primate species (orangutans, gorillas, golden lion tamarins, ring-tailed 
lemurs, and black-and-white ruffed lemurs) on all tasks in the traditional object 
permanence test battery, using controls for every task in the battery. This is the first study 
to conduct control trials for all tasks in the battery, and will thus aid in a more thorough 
evaluation of object permanence in the species under study (although properly analyzed 
control tasks are the only valid indicators of fully-developed object permanence as 
discussed in this introduction, I conducted regular trials as well, for comparison with 
previous research).  
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2. Ensure that no other simple search strategy can account for success in solving the tasks 
in the traditional test battery (to my knowledge, this is the first study to conduct a 
complete analysis to check for this). 
3. Present double displacement tasks to gorillas and orangutans in a locomotive space, to 
see if they can solve non-adjacent double invisible displacement trials (this is the first 
study to present these tests in a locomotive space to non-human primate species). 
4. See if I can find support for Call’s (2001) response-bias inhibition hypothesis by 
analyzing the different types of successes and errors on double invisible displacements. 
 
Hypotheses Tested 
1. All species tested with the traditional linear arrangement will perform above chance 
on all visible and invisible tasks, except for the non-adjacent double invisible 
displacements. 
2. All species tested with the traditional linear arrangement will make a significantly 
greater percentage of second-choice errors on non-adjacent double invisible displacement 
trials, when compared to adjacent trials. 
3. The gorillas and orangutans tested with the arrangement in locomotive space will 
perform above chance on non-adjacent double invisible displacements (as hypothesized 
by Call, 2001). 
4. All species will distinguish between the two boxes visited by the experimenter on all 
tasks requiring two displacements, when tested with either arrangement (that is, they will 









     Subjects were housed at Zoo Atlanta during this study. Data could not be collected on 
two of the five species: the ten golden lion tamarins could not be habituated to the 
apparatus, and the four ring-tailed lemurs could not be separated into individual 
enclosures for testing. Data were collected on seven Sumatran orangutans (Pongo abelii), 
two western lowland gorillas (Gorilla gorilla gorilla), and five black-and-white ruffed 
lemurs (Varecia variegata). All subjects were adult animals. Subjects were tested 
individually, in their indoor enclosures. They were fed according to their normal daily 
routine. Water was available ad libitum. Subjects were not deprived of food or water 
during testing. One of the Sumatran orangutans (Chantek) had extensive experience with 
humans from an early age (Miles, 1990, 1994).  
 
Procedure 
     The study consisted of two phases-- one using the traditional linear methodology, and 
the other using locomotive space as per Call’s (2001) suggestion. During the first phase, 
there was a pretest period, during which the subjects were given a chance to become 
familiar with the testing situation and apparatus, and the subjects’ ability to point to their 





Apparatus     
     The apparatus consisted of three opaque wooden boxes. The back-side of each box 
was open in order to hide the reward. The boxes were placed in a row (with some space 
in between the boxes) on a wooden rectangular platform (see Figure 2 below; X 
represents the subject behind the barrier; E represents the experimenter; the three boxes 
are labeled as A, B, and C, in order, from left to right). A transparent displacer was used 
during visible displacement trials and an opaque one was used during invisible 
displacement trials. Rewards used were grapes, raisins, peanuts, and apple pieces 
(depending on subjects’ preference). 
 
Figure 2. Linear Arrangement. 
 
Pretest      
     During the pretest, the boxes were placed on the platform in such a way that the 
subject could see that they were empty (the open side of the boxes faced the subject). The 
experimenter (E) sat facing the subject behind the platform, placed a reward in one of the 
boxes in full-view of the subject, and then overturned all the boxes so that the subject 
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could not see the reward anymore. E then pushed the platform against the enclosure and 
the subject was allowed to select one of the boxes. If the subject selected the baited box, 
he/she received the food reward. If the subject selected the unbaited box, he/she was 
simply shown the empty box, and the experimenter retrieved the reward out of view of 
the subject, before moving on to the next trial. Subjects received six trials presented in a 
single session.  
     All the gorillas and orangutans at Zoo Atlanta understand “pointing” and were able to 
unambiguously point with their fingers to their chosen box (if they could reach the box, 
they would even touch their chosen box with one or more fingers). The lemurs had to be 
trained to point with their noses using a basic shaping procedure. On average, it took 
three 15 minute sessions to train each lemur to unambiguously point to one box out of an 
array of three (upon the prompt “where is it?”). “It” refers to the reward. The shaping 
procedure in no way resembled the procedure for the actual tasks. Rewards were not 
moved and hidden for them to find in a way that would have been done during testing. 
All three boxes were baited on every trial during shaping, and baiting was done without 
subjects’ attention being drawn to the baiting.  
 
Test 
     During the test, the boxes were placed on the platform in such a way that the subject 
could not see inside of them (the open side of the boxes faced the experimenter). During 
visible displacements, the experimenter placed the reward in the transparent displacer in 
full view of the subject, and performed the displacements by moving it above the board, 
and finally placing the reward in a randomly pre-determined box (this is a box that was 
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selected randomly prior to testing). After the reward was placed inside the box, the 
displacer was removed and shown to be empty to the subject. After the displacements 
were completed, the board was pushed towards the subject so that he or she could make a 
response. During invisible displacements, the same procedure was followed, except that 
the reward was first placed in the opaque displacer and then transferred to a randomly 
pre-determined box. The following tests were administered:3 
     Test 1: Single visible displacement. The reward was placed in the transparent 
displacer in full view of the subject. The displacer was then moved into one of the boxes, 
where the reward was left. The reward was hidden under the same box on all trials.  
Subjects were randomly assigned to groups that differed in which boxes were used for 
hiding (for instance, for the two gorilla subjects, one saw the experimenter place the 
reward in box A, and the other saw the experimenter place the reward in box C). 
     Test 2: Sequential visible displacement. After the last trial of test 1, the reward was 
hidden in a different box for a few trials. That is, subjects that saw the reward being 
placed in box A in test 1, now saw the reward being placed in box C, and vice versa. 
     Test 3: Alternate single visible displacement. On each trial, the experimenter varied 
the location of the reward among boxes A, B, and C.  
     Note: For some of the subjects, control trials were presented during each of the three 
tasks mentioned above, in which the empty displacer was moved into a second box, after 
the reward was dropped into the first box visited. This controlled for the use of the 
strategy “search in the last location visited.” 
                                                 
3
 In all the tests described, after the displacer was removed from the last box visited, it was shown to be 
empty and moved away to a randomly pre-determined location (a spot on either side of the array of boxes, 
or a spot in between the boxes). 
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     Test 4: Double visible displacement. Within a single trial the displacer was moved 
into one box, removed, and then moved into a second box, where the reward was hidden.  
The succession of boxes visited was randomly pre-determined. Some control trials were 
presented, in which the empty displacer was moved into a third box, after the reward was 
dropped into the second box visited. This controlled for the use of the strategy “search in 
the last location visited.” 
     Test 5: Single invisible displacement. The reward was placed in the opaque displacer 
in full view of the subject. The displacer was then moved into one of the boxes, where the 
reward was left. The reward was hidden under the same box on all trials. Subjects were 
randomly assigned to groups that differed in which boxes were used for hiding. 
     Test 6: Sequential invisible displacement. After the last trial of test 5, the reward was 
hidden in a different box for a few trials, with the same procedure as in test 5. That is, 
subjects that saw the displacer being placed in box A in test 5, now saw the displacer 
being placed in box C, and vice versa. 
     Test 7: Alternate single invisible displacement. On each trial, the experimenter varied 
the location of the reward among boxes A, B, and C.  
     Note: For some of the subjects, control trials were presented during tests 5, 6, and 7, in 
which the empty displacer was moved into a second box, after the reward was dropped 
into the first box visited. This controlled for the use of the strategy “search in the last 
location visited.” 
     Test 8: Double invisible displacement. Within a single trial the displacer was moved 
into one box, removed, and then moved into a second box. The reward was left in either 
one of those boxes. The succession of boxes visited was randomly pre-determined. Some 
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control trials were presented, in which the empty displacer was moved into a third box, 
after being shown as empty. Subjects were given a second chance to look for the reward 
if their first choice involved a “relevant” box (if not, the trial ended at once). A relevant 
box in a double invisible regular trial is one which the experimenter visited but did not 
bait. A relevant box in a double invisible control trial is one which the full displacer went 
into, but not where the reward was left.  
     These tests were given to each subject over the course of anywhere from 2 to 10 
sessions (depending on how quickly the subject went through the tasks). Each testing 
session lasted anywhere from 5 minutes to 1 hour, depending on subjects’ attention. Not 
all tests could be administered to all subjects because some subjects refused to participate 
after some time elapsed during each testing session (please refer to the tables for the 
number of subjects per test). For the same reason, the total number of trials per task 
varied (as can be seen in the tables). On tests 1 to 7, if the subject chose the baited box as 
a first response, E lifted the chosen box, thus revealing the reward and allowing the 
subject to retrieve it (or giving the subject the reward). If the subject touched an unbaited 
box, E showed the box as empty, retrieved the reward out of view of the subject, and then 
went on to the next trial. If the subject did not make a response within 15 seconds after 
the board was moved towards the enclosure, E retrieved the reward out of view of the 
subject and repeated the trial (after making sure the subject was paying attention). The 
flowchart on the next page (Figure 3) shows the procedure for test 8 (in the flowchart, 
“relevant box” refers to a box visited by the experimenter; it could be baited or unbaited). 
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                 Figure 3. Flowchart detailing steps in test 8. 
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     The apparatus consisted of three remote-controlled cars; an overturned cardboard box 
was attached to the top of each car in order to make a flat platform on which each 
wooden box could be placed to hide the reward. The cars were placed about a foot away 
from the enclosure, and several feet away from each other. After the displacements were 
completed, the cars were simultaneously moved towards the subjects so that they could 
make a response. This set-up created a presentation of boxes in locomotive space (in 
double invisible displacements, once the subjects chose a visited but unbaited box, they 
needed to walk over to another box to make their second response). The same displacers 
and rewards that were used in Phase I were used in Phase II. The cars could not be used 
in the lemur enclosures because of space limitations, and so only gorillas and orangutans 
were tested in Phase II.  
 
Test 
      
     During testing, double invisible displacements were performed as described 
previously, with the exception that in Phase II, the experimenter had to move around to 
complete the displacements (instead of sitting in front of the subject and completing the 
displacements over a smaller space). Four orangutans and two gorillas were tested. As in 
Phase I, the number of trials that could be administered depended on subject motivation 
to participate. Each orangutan received an average of 17 trials, and each gorilla received 
an average of 24 trials. 
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Standardized Protocol Used for all Tests in Both Phases 
1. Trials in which the subjects were not paying attention to the displacements were 
stopped, and the trial was presented again. Test sessions were terminated and continued 
on another day if the subjects continued to be “inattentive” or “unmotivated.” Subjects 
were considered to be inattentive or unmotivated if they failed to make a response within 
15 seconds on five consecutive trials, turned gaze/body away from the apparatus before 
the displacements were completed, or started manipulating other objects in the enclosure 
and did not come back to the testing apparatus even after being called repeatedly, or 
shown a food reward.  
2. This was a double blind study. I was one of the experimenters; I would sit in front of 
the apparatus, call for attention, perform the displacements, make sure the subject was 
attending to the entire displacement trajectory, bait a box, lower my head, close my eyes, 
and push the board towards the subject, while saying “where is it?” The second 
experimenter stood a little distance away. She would avert her gaze until I said “where is 
it?” and then quickly look to note the subject’s response. We made sure that she did not 
see which box was being baited, and that I did not see which box was being chosen. 
When the second experimenter called out the chosen box, I would look up, show the 
subject what was under the chosen box, and if it was the correct box, I would give the 
subject the reward. If the subject touched the incorrect box, I showed the box as empty, 
retrieved the reward out of view of the subject, and then went on to the next trial. Phase 2 
required a slightly different approach. After baiting a box, I would walk away with my 
face averted, saying “where is it?” The second experimenter would then use the remote 
control to move the cars forward so that the subject could make a response. The second 
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experimenter would then call out the chosen box, and I would walk back to either show 
the subject an empty box (if an incorrect response was made) or to reward the subject (if 
a correct response was made).  
3. I made sure that there were no auditory cues by covering part of the board with a soft 
cloth that muffled any sound that the dropping of the reward might have caused. Both 
experimenters wore hats during all the sessions to prevent inadvertent gaze cues. 
4. The following randomizations were incorporated into the procedure: 
a. The initial and final positions of the displacer were randomized across trials (it could 
occupy either the terminal positions or the positions in-between the boxes).  
b. The order of boxes visited by the experimenter was randomly pre-determined.  
c. The final location of the reward was randomly pre-determined for every trial on 
alternate and double displacements. 
e. The invisible and visible displacement tasks were counterbalanced to make sure that 
performance on one kind of task was not affected just because subjects were already 
exposed to the other. In this context, counterbalancing refers to the random assignment of 
subjects to two groups that differed in the order of presentation of visible and invisible 
displacement tasks  
5. There were two types of double displacement trials: 1. Adjacent trials in which the 
displacer visited two adjacent boxes; and 2. Non-adjacent trials in which the displacer 










     The binomial test was used to analyze group performance on each task, wherein I 
compared observed number of successes with the number expected if the subject was 
responding completely randomly.  
     To analyze single displacement regular tasks (single, sequential, and alternate visible, 
as well as single, sequential, and alternate invisible), the actual number of correct choices 
was compared with the number expected if the subjects were randomly choosing one box 
out of three (the probability of succeeding by doing this is 0.33). If there was no 
significant difference, then it was concluded that the subjects failed the task. If there was 
a significant difference, then I verified whether subjects used a strategy of “search in the 
last location visited,” by analyzing control trials. 
     Controls for single displacement tasks (single, sequential, and alternate visible 
displacements, and single, sequential, and alternate invisible displacements) were 
analyzed as follows: 
1. The actual number of correct choices made by the subjects was compared with the 
number expected if the subjects were randomly choosing one box out of three (the 
probability of succeeding by doing this is 0.33). If there was no significant 
difference, then it was concluded that the subjects failed the task, and no further 
analysis was conducted. 
2. If the number of correct choices was significantly higher than the expected 
number, then the strategy of “search in the last location visited” was eliminated. I 
then verified whether the subjects were using a strategy of randomly choosing 
between the two boxes visited by the experimenter (the probability of succeeding 
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by doing this is 0.5). This was done by comparing the number of choices to the 
baited box with the number of choices to the non-baited visited box (not using the 
total number of trials; only the number of trials on which subjects visited one of 
the two boxes in question). If there was no significant difference, then it was 
concluded that the subjects failed the task, because they were not distinguishing 
between the two boxes visited by the experimenter. If the number of choices to 
the baited box was significantly higher than to the unbaited visited box, then it 
was concluded that the subjects were not using the strategy of “randomly 
choosing between the two boxes visited by the experimenter” (however, subjects 
might still be using the strategy of “search in the first location visited,” and 
analysis of the double visible displacement regular task is required to eliminate 
possible use of this strategy).  
 
     Regular double visible displacements were analyzed in a similar manner: 
1. The actual number of correct choices made by the subjects was compared with the 
number expected if the subject were randomly choosing one box out of three (the 
probability of succeeding by doing this is 0.33). If there was no significant 
difference, then it was concluded that the subjects failed the task, and no further 
analysis was conducted. 
2. If the number of correct choices was significantly higher than the expected 
number, then the strategy of “search in the first location visited” was eliminated. I 
then verified whether the subjects were using a strategy of randomly choosing 
between the two boxes visited by the experimenter (the probability of succeeding 
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by doing this is 0.5). This was done by comparing the number of choices to the 
baited box with the number of choices to the non-baited visited box (not using the 
total number of trials; only the number of trials on which subjects visited one of 
the two boxes in question). If there was no significant difference, then it was 
concluded that the subjects failed the task, because they were not distinguishing 
between the two boxes visited by the experimenter. If the number of choices to 
the baited box was significantly higher than to the unbaited visited box, then it 
was concluded that the subjects were not using the strategy of “randomly 
choosing between the two boxes visited by the experimenter.” 
     If all known possible search strategies were eliminated when analyzing the double 
visible displacement task, as well as controls for single visible displacement tasks, then it 
was concluded that subjects were successful on visible displacements. Success on double 
visible controls will further strengthen this conclusion.  
     To analyze double visible controls, the actual number of correct choices was 
compared with the number expected if the subjects were randomly choosing one box out 
of three (the probability of succeeding by doing this is 0.33). If there was no significant 
difference, then it was concluded that the subjects failed the task. If there was a 
significant difference, then it was concluded that subjects solved the task without the use 
of either strategy (“search in the last location visited” or “search in the first location 
visited”). In these control tasks, because three boxes are visited, the question of the 
strategy of “randomly choosing between the two boxes visited by the experimenter” does 
not arise. 
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     In double invisible regular and control trials (in which the reward can be placed in 
either one of the first two boxes visited by the experimenter), subjects were given a 
second chance to look for the reward if their first choice involved a box visited (but not 
baited) by the experimenter (after the subject’s first choice, all three boxes were still 
available to the subject). Thus, the probability of succeeding by chance in these trials was 
1/2. This is because there are two ways of succeeding on a trial: 
1. The subject could succeed (in the first choice itself) by randomly choosing one of the 
three boxes (probability of which is 1/3).  
OR 
2. The subject could first pick the relevant box4 (probability of doing this is 1/3), and then 
pick the baited box when given the second chance (probability of doing this is 1/2 
because the subject is now choosing between the two remaining boxes). Thus, the overall 
probability of this type of second-choice success is (1/3) * (1/2), which is 1/6.   
     The combined probability of either of these events occurring is (1/3) + (1/6), which is 
1/2. This is the probability of chance success in double invisible regular and control trials. 
If subjects performed significantly above chance on double invisible regular trials, then it 
was concluded that they solved these trials without the use of either strategy (“search in 
the last location visited” or “search in the first location visited”). However, we cannot 
rule out the possibility that they are using the strategy of “randomly choosing between the 
two boxes visited by the experimenter,” unless this strategy was eliminated when 
                                                 
4
 A relevant box in a double invisible regular trial is one which the experimenter visited but did not bait. A 
relevant box in a double invisible control trial is one which the full displacer went into, but not where the 
reward was left.  
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analyzing controls for single invisible displacement tasks. If it was, then we can conclude 
that subjects were successful on invisible displacements.  
     If subjects performed significantly above chance on double invisible control trials, 
then it was concluded that subjects solved these trials without the use of either strategy 
(“search in the last location visited” or “search in the first location visited”). In these 
control tasks, because three boxes are visited, the question of the strategy of “randomly 
choosing between the two boxes visited by the experimenter” does not arise. 
     I also calculated the percentages of the following different types of successes and 
errors in adjacent and non-adjacent double invisible displacement trials (I compared the 
percentage of first-choice errors in adjacent and non-adjacent trials, as well as the 
percentage of second-choice errors in adjacent and non-adjacent trials using Wilcoxon 
signed ranks exact tests): 
1. First-choice successes occur if a subject chooses the baited box on the first attempt. 
2. First-choice errors occur if a subject chooses a non-baited, non-visited box on the first 
attempt. 
3. Second-choice successes occur if a subject chooses the visited, non-baited box on the 
first attempt, and the baited box on the second attempt. 
4. Second-choice errors occur if a subject chooses the visited, non-baited box on the first 

















     All the orangutans were able to unambiguously point with their fingers to their chosen 
box (if they could reach the box, they would even touch their chosen box with one or 
more fingers).  
 
Phase I 
Visible Displacement Tasks 
     Orangutans performed above chance5 on single, sequential, and alternate visible 
displacement regular tasks (binomial distribution, p < 0.05). Orangutans also performed 
above chance on single and sequential visible displacement control tasks (binomial 
distribution, p < 0.05). Further analysis6 showed that there was a significant difference 
between the number of choices to the baited box and the number of choices to the 
unbaited visited box on single and sequential visible controls (binomial distribution,  
p < 0.05). Orangutans did not perform above chance on the alternate visible displacement 
control task (binomial distribution, p > 0.05).  
                                                 
5
 For the rest of the document, “performing above chance” means that the actual number of correct choices 
made by the subjects was significantly greater than the number expected if the subjects were randomly 
choosing one box out of three (the probability of succeeding by doing this is 0.33). This applies for all 
tasks, except for double invisible displacements, in which case, probability of chance success is 0.5.  
 
6
 For the rest of the document “further analysis” means that I checked whether the subjects were using a 
strategy of randomly choosing between the two boxes visited by the experimenter (the probability of 
succeeding by doing this is 0.5). This was done by comparing the number of choices to the baited box with 
the number of choices to the non-baited visited box (not using the total number of trials; only the number of 
trials on which subjects visited one of the two boxes in question).  
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     Orangutans performed above chance on the double visible displacement regular task 
(binomial distribution, p < 0.05). Further analysis showed that there was a significant 
difference between the number of choices to the baited box and the number of choices to 
the unbaited visited box on these displacements (binomial distribution, p < 0.05).  
     Double visible displacements were divided into adjacent and non-adjacent trials. 
Orangutans performed above chance on adjacent trials (binomial distribution, p < 0.05), 
and further analysis showed that there was a significant difference between the number of 
choices to the baited box and the number of choices to the unbaited visited box for these 
trials (binomial distribution, p < 0.05). Orangutans did not perform above chance on non-
adjacent double visible displacements (binomial distribution, p > 0.05). 
     Post-hoc analysis showed that on the double visible non-adjacent trials, the number of 
choices to the irrelevant center box were significantly more than the number of choices to 
the visited but unbaited box (binomial distribution, p < 0.05). 
     Orangutans performed above chance on double visible displacement controls 
(binomial distribution, p = 0.05). 
     Please refer to Table 1 for a summary of orangutan performance on visible 


























Regular                 
  Single 6 37 52 71.2 Yes  --   Yes 
  Sequential 6 47 56 84 Yes --  Yes 
  Alternate 5 47 72 65.3 Yes --  Yes 
  Double 5 34 70 48.6 Yes Yes Yes 
  Double adjacent 5 22 35 62.9 Yes Yes Yes 
  Double non-
adjacent 
5 12 35 34.3 No -- No 
Control         
  
      
  Single 6 20 31 64.5 Yes Yes Yes 
  Sequential 2 8 9 88.9 Yes Yes Yes 
  Alternate 2 6 17 35.3 No  -- No 
  Double 5 15 31 48.4 Yes  -- Yes 
 
Note. Dashes indicate that it was not necessary to check whether subjects were using the strategy of “randomly choosing between the 
two boxes visited by the experimenter,” because it was either not applicable (that is, for single, sequential, and alternate regular trials, 
and double visible controls), or because subjects did not perform above chance (for instance, double visible non-adjacent trials and 





Table 1 (continued) 
 
a 
 A “yes” in this column means that the actual number of correct choices made by the subjects was significantly greater than the 
number expected if the subjects were randomly choosing one box out of three (the probability of succeeding by doing this is 0.33), 
according to the binomial distribution (alpha = 0.05).  
 
b A “yes” in this column means that the subjects were not using the strategy of “randomly choosing between the two boxes visited by 
the experimenter.” The number of choices to the baited box was significantly greater than the number of choices to the non-baited 
visited box, according to the binomial distribution (alpha = 0.05).  
 
c A “yes” in this column means that all possible strategies have been eliminated. This varies from task to task. A “no” means that 
subjects either did not perform above chance, or performed above chance, but did not distinguish between the two visited boxes. 
Please refer to the Data Analysis section in Chapter 2 for more details.  
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Invisible Displacement Tasks 
     Orangutans performed above chance on the single, sequential, and alternate invisible 
displacement regular tasks (binomial distribution, p < 0.05). Orangutans also performed 
above chance on single and sequential invisible displacement control tasks (binomial 
distribution, p < 0.05). Further analysis showed that there was a significant difference 
between the number of choices to the baited box and the number of choices to the 
unbaited visited box on single and sequential invisible controls (binomial distribution, 
 p < 0.05). Orangutans did not perform above chance on the alternate invisible 
displacement control task (binomial distribution, p > 0.05).  
     Orangutans performed above chance on the double invisible displacement (binomial 
distribution, p < 0.05). This task was divided into adjacent and non-adjacent trials. 
Orangutans performed above chance on adjacent (binomial distribution, p < 0.05), but not 
on non-adjacent (binomial distribution, p > 0.05) double invisible displacements. 
Orangutans did not perform above chance on double invisible displacement controls 
(binomial distribution, p > 0.05). 
     Please refer to Table 2 for a summary of orangutan performance on invisible 








Table 2. Orangutan Performance on Invisible Displacement Tasks in Phase I. 
 
  

















Regular         
  
      
  Single 6 26 30 86.7 Yes --  Yes 
  Sequential 6 28 44 63.6 Yes --  Yes 
  Alternate 6 40 59 67.8 Yes --  Yes 
  Double 5 43 65 66.2 Yes --  Yes 
  Double adjacent 5 29 34 85.3 Yes --  Yes 
  Double non-
adjacent 
5 14 31 45.2 No --  No 
Control         
  
      
  Single 6 23 25 92 Yes Yes Yes 
  Sequential 2 5 5 100 Yes Yes Yes 
  Alternate 2 6 12 50 No --  No 
  Double 5 12 24 50 No -- No 
 
Note. Dashes indicate that it was not necessary to check whether subjects were using the strategy of “randomly choosing between the 
two boxes visited by the experimenter,” because it was either not applicable (that is, for single, sequential, alternate, and double 






Table 2 (continued) 
 
a 
 A “yes” in this column means that the actual number of correct choices made by the subjects was significantly greater than the 
number expected if the subjects were randomly choosing one box out of three (the probability of succeeding by doing this is 0.33), 
according to the binomial distribution (alpha = 0.05). This applies for all tasks, except for double invisible displacements (including 
adjacent, non-adjacent, and control trials), in which case, probability of chance success is 0.5. 
 
b A “yes” in this column means that the subjects were not using the strategy of “randomly choosing between the two boxes visited by 
the experimenter.” The number of choices to the baited box was significantly greater than the number of choices to the non-baited 
visited box, according to the binomial distribution (alpha = 0.05).  
 
c A “yes” in this column means that all possible strategies have been eliminated. This varies from task to task. A “no” means that 
subjects either did not perform above chance, or performed above chance, but did not distinguish between the two visited boxes. 
Please refer to the Data Analysis section in Chapter 2 for more details.  
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     I also calculated the percentages of the different types of errors and successes in 
adjacent and non-adjacent double invisible displacement trials (see Table 3). The sample 
size was too low to run a Wilcoxon signed ranks exact test to compare the percentage of 
second-choice errors in adjacent and non-adjacent trials. Post-hoc analysis showed that 
there was no significant difference between the percentage of first-choice errors in non-




Table 3. Mean Percentage of First- and Second-Choice Successes and Errors for  
              Orangutans in Double Invisible Displacements in Phase I. 
 
 
First choice Second choice 
Type of 
displacement Success Error Success Error 
Adjacent 45.5 14.5 37.5 2.5 





     Only regular double invisible displacements were administered in this phase. 
Orangutans performed above chance on the double invisible displacement task (binomial 
distribution, p < 0.05). This task was divided into adjacent and non-adjacent trials. 
Orangutans performed above chance on adjacent (binomial distribution, p < 0.05), but not 
on non-adjacent (binomial distribution, p > 0.05) double invisible displacements.  
     Please refer to Table 4 for a summary of orangutan performance on double invisible 
displacements in Phase II. 
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Invisible             
  Double 4 50 71 70.4 Yes 
  Double adjacent 4 27 28 96.4 Yes 
  Double non-
adjacent 
4 23 43 53.5 No 
 
a 
 A “yes” in this column means that the actual number of correct choices made by the 
subjects was significantly greater than the number expected if the subjects were randomly 
choosing the correct box out of three (the probability of succeeding by doing this is 0.5), 
according to the binomial distribution (alpha = 0.05). Please refer to the Data Analysis 
section in Chapter 2 for more details.  
 
     I also calculated the percentages of the different types of errors and successes in 
adjacent and non-adjacent double invisible displacement trials (see Table 5). There was 
no significant difference between the percentage of second-choice errors in non-adjacent 
and adjacent trials (Wilcoxon signed ranks exact test: Total N = 4; ties = 0; ns). Post-hoc 
analysis showed that there was no significant difference between the percentage of first-
choice errors in non-adjacent and adjacent trials (Wilcoxon signed ranks exact test: Total 









Table 5. Mean Percentage of First- and Second-Choice Successes and Errors for  
              Orangutans in Double Invisible Displacements in Phase II. 
 
 
First choice Second choice 
Type of 
displacement Success Error Success Error 
Adjacent 75.4 4.1 20.5 0 








     Orangutans as a group passed all regular tasks that required a single displacement (i.e., 
single, sequential, and alternate visible tasks, as well as single, sequential, and alternate 
invisible tasks). These results replicated those of previous researchers who studied apes 
(Barth & Call, 2006; Call, 2001; Collier-Baker et al., 2006; de Blois et al., 1998). 
However, as discussed previously, regular tasks can be solved by the use of the strategy 
“search in the box visited by the experimenter,” and thus, control tasks (in which the 
empty displacer is moved into a second box, after the reward is left in the first box 
visited) need to be administered and analyzed, before firm conclusions can be drawn 
about the ability to solve single displacement tasks. Previous researchers have found that 
orangutans (de Blois et al., 1998) and chimpanzees (Collier-Baker et al., 2006) can solve 
single invisible displacement controls (these are the only single displacement controls 
that apes have been tested on). The present study used controls for all tasks, and found 
that orangutans passed most single displacement controls. A complete analysis showed 
that subjects were distinguishing between the two boxes visited by the experimenter (a 
complete analysis to check for this had never been done in previous studies).  
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     The only control tasks that orangutans failed were the alternate visible and invisible 
controls. However, only a low number of these control trials could be administered to 
only two subjects. Since there were larger sample sizes (both in terms of the number of 
trials, and the number of subjects) for the other tasks, it seems reasonable to conclude that 
the group of orangutans under study passed single visible and invisible displacement 
controls without the use of the following strategies: “search in the last location visited” 
and “randomly choosing between the two boxes visited by the experimenter.” However, 
subjects might still have been using the strategy of “search in the first location visited,” 
and analysis of double visible displacements is required to eliminate possible use of this 
strategy. 
     Orangutans in the present study did pass the double visible displacement regular task. 
This finding replicates that of previous researchers who studied apes (Call, 2001; de Blois 
et al., 1998), and adds further confirmation because I conducted a complete analysis to 
ensure that the subjects were indeed distinguishing between the two boxes visited by the 
experimenter. Success on the double visible displacement regular task shows that subjects 
were not using the strategy of “search in the first location visited.” Since subjects passed 
both the single visible controls, and the double visible displacement regular task, it can be 
concluded that they successfully passed visible displacement tasks without the use of any 
known strategy. Subjects in the present study also passed double visible displacement 
controls, which further strengthens this conclusion. 
     When the double visible displacement regular task was divided into adjacent and non-
adjacent trials, subjects were found to solve adjacent, but not non-adjacent, trials.7 Post-
                                                 
7
 The only other study to divide this task in this manner was conducted by Call (2001), who found that 
chimpanzees and orangutans solved both types of trials. 
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hoc analysis showed that on the double visible non-adjacent trials, the number of choices 
to the irrelevant center box were significantly more than the number of choices to the 
visited but unbaited box. This indicates that the experimenter’s “skipping of a box” 
(which does not arise in an adjacent trial), makes a non-adjacent trial more difficult, thus 
leading to a response of picking the center box (the same problem arose in the double 
invisible tasks as can be seen later in this discussion).  
     Orangutans as a group passed the double invisible displacement regular task in the 
present study.8 This task was divided into adjacent and non-adjacent trials, and 
orangutans were found to solve adjacent, but not non-adjacent, trials. These findings 
replicate those of previous researchers who studied apes (Barth & Call, 2006; Call, 2001; 
Collier-Baker & Suddendorf, 2006; de Blois et al., 1998). However, my results differ 
from previous work when comparing the different types of successes and errors in 
adjacent and non-adjacent trials. In particular, previous researchers (Call, 2001; Collier-
Baker & Suddendorf, 2006) found a significantly greater percentage of second-choice 
errors in non-adjacent trials, when compared to adjacent trials, which meant that after 
having chosen a relevant box, subjects were usually choosing the center box (which was 
never visited by the experimenter). This finding led Call (2001) to put forth the response-
bias inhibition hypothesis, which states that apes have a bias towards searching in a 
sequence, with an inability to inhibit choosing the center box on non-adjacent trials. In 
contrast, my study did not fully replicate this previous finding-- although my subjects did 




 Subjects failed controls trials in double invisible displacements. 
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adjacent trials, it could not be determined whether or not this difference was statistically 
significant, because of a low sample size. 
     However, a closer look at my results shows some support for the response-bias 
inhibition hypothesis, though in a different way. Whenever my subjects did get a second 
chance, after having chosen a relevant box on their first choice in non-adjacent trials, they 
always (100% of the time) chose the unbaited center box that was never visited by the 
experimenter. Another interesting finding was that my subjects made a greater percentage 
of first-choice errors in non-adjacent, compared to adjacent trials, although post-hoc 
analysis showed that this difference was not statistically significant (the role of first-
choice errors has not been discussed in previous research). Thus, it appears that both first 
and second-choice errors contribute to the overall failure in the non-adjacent double 
invisible displacement trials (see Table 3).9  
     In sum, orangutans in the present study passed all visible and invisible displacement 
tasks, except for the non-adjacent trials in double visible and double invisible 
displacements. Since the possible use of all known strategies was eliminated with the 
analysis of the visible displacement tasks, it can be concluded that orangutans understand 
that an object continues to exist even when it is not perceived, and are capable of tracking 
successive visible displacements, but with some limitations in non-adjacent 
displacements. Since the use of the strategy of “randomly choosing between the two 
boxes visited by the experimenter” was not found in the visible and invisible 
                                                 
9
 This was the case in Call (2001) as well. His subjects made a larger number of first-choice errors in non-
adjacent trials, as opposed to adjacent trials (although this difference was not significant). Along with his 
finding of a significantly greater number of second-choice errors in non-adjacent trials, this implies that 




displacement control tasks, it would be reasonable to conclude that they are not using this 
strategy to solve adjacent trials in the double invisible displacement task. It can thus be 
concluded that orangutans are capable of representing the unperceived trajectory of an 
object, but with some limitations because they failed non-adjacent and control trials in 
double invisible displacements.  
 
Phase II 
     As discussed in the introduction, Phase II was conducted to answer one of the 
questions that researchers of object permanence in primates are currently trying to 
answer. Are apes capable of representing the unperceived trajectory of an object, but with 
some limits to this capacity? Or are these performance limitations a result of the manner 
in which the tasks are presented? Call (2001) hypothesized that arranging the boxes close 
together in space might be causing the response bias of searching in a sequence, with an 
inability to inhibit choosing the center box. He suggested presenting tasks in a locomotive 
(not a small-scale) space, because having to move from one location to another might 
introduce costs associated with traveling and may reduce the tendency to search in 
locations that have not been visited by the experimenter (that is, the center box). If apes 
succeed on non-adjacent double invisible displacement trials in locomotive space, it 
would confirm that they are indeed fully capable of representing the unperceived 
trajectory of an object. Thus, one goal of this dissertation was to present double invisible 
displacement tasks to orangutans in a locomotive space, to see if they could solve non-
adjacent double invisible displacement trials.10 
                                                 
10
 I also tried to administer the other tasks in the battery for comparative purposes; however, the number of 
trials per task that I was able to administer was too low for any reliable conclusions to be drawn. 
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     Orangutans passed the double invisible displacement regular task in Phase II. As in 
Phase I, when this task was divided into adjacent and non-adjacent trials, orangutans 
were found to solve the former, but not the latter. The pattern of the different types of 
errors and successes in Phase II was very similar to that in Phase I. As in Phase I, it 
appeared that both first and second-choice errors contributed to the overall failure in the 
non-adjacent double invisible displacement trials. The percentage of second-choice errors 
was greater in non-adjacent, when compared to adjacent trials, although this difference 
was not statistically significant. Similarly, post-hoc analysis showed that the percentage 
of first-choice errors was greater in non-adjacent, when compared to adjacent trials, 
although this difference was not statistically significant. (see Table 5). Thus, presenting 
the boxes in locomotive space did not reduce the tendency to search in a location that was 
not visited by the experimenter. Further research is required to resolve the question of 





















     All the gorillas were able to unambiguously point with their fingers to their chosen 
box (if they could reach the box, they would even touch their chosen box with one or 
more fingers).  
 
Phase I 
Visible Displacement Tasks 
     Gorillas performed above chance on single, sequential, and alternate visible 
displacement regular tasks (binomial distribution, p < 0.05). Gorillas also performed 
above chance on single visible displacement controls (binomial distribution, p < 0.05). 
Further analysis showed that there was a significant difference between the number of 
choices to the baited box and the number of choices to the unbaited visited box on these 
controls (binomial distribution, p < 0.05). Control trials for sequential and alternate 
visible displacements could not be conducted because of a lack of subject motivation to 
participate. 
     Gorillas performed above chance on the double visible displacement regular task 
(binomial distribution, p < 0.05). However, further analysis showed that there was no 
significant difference between the number of choices to the baited box and the number of 
choices to the unbaited visited box on these displacements (binomial distribution,  
p > 0.05). 
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     Double visible displacements were divided into adjacent and non-adjacent trials. 
Gorillas did not perform above chance on adjacent trials (binomial distribution, p > 0.05). 
Furthermore, post-hoc analysis indicates that for these trials, there was no significant 
difference between the number of choices to the baited box and the number of choices to 
the unbaited visited box (binomial distribution, p > 0.05). Gorillas performed above 
chance on non-adjacent trials (binomial distribution, p < 0.05). However, further analysis 
showed that there was no significant difference between the number of choices to the 
baited box and the number of choices to the unbaited visited box on non-adjacent trials 
(binomial distribution, p > 0.05). 
     Gorillas did not perform above chance on double visible controls (binomial 
distribution, p > 0.05). 
     Please refer to Table 6 for a summary of gorilla performance on visible displacement 































Regular         
 Single 2 8 8 100 Yes -- Yes 
 Sequential 2 10 14 71.4 Yes -- Yes 
 Alternate 2 21 34 61.8 Yes -- Yes 
 Double 2 14 22 63.6 Yes No No 
 Double 
adjacent 
2 7 12 58.3 No Nod No 
 Double non-
adjacent 
2 7 10 70 Yes No No 
Control         
 Single 2 7 8 87.5 Yes Yes Yes 
 Double 2 7 12 58.3 No -- No 
 
Note. Dashes indicate that it was not necessary to check whether subjects were using the strategy of “randomly choosing between the 
two boxes visited by the experimenter,” because it was not applicable (that is, for single, sequential, and alternate regular trials, and 







Table 6 (continued) 
 
a 
 A “yes” in this column means that the actual number of correct choices made by the subjects was significantly greater than the 
number expected if the subjects were randomly choosing one box out of three (the probability of succeeding by doing this is 0.33), 
according to the binomial distribution (alpha = 0.05).  
 
b A “yes” in this column means that the subjects were not using the strategy of “randomly choosing between the two boxes visited by 
the experimenter.” The number of choices to the baited box was significantly greater than the number of choices to the non-baited 
visited box, according to the binomial distribution (alpha = 0.05).  
 
c A “yes” in this column means that all possible strategies have been eliminated. This varies from task to task. A “no” means that 
subjects either did not perform above chance, or performed above chance, but did not distinguish between the two visited boxes. 
Please refer to the Data Analysis section in Chapter 2 for more details.  
 




Invisible Displacement Tasks 
     Gorillas performed above chance on single, sequential, and alternate invisible 
displacement regular tasks (binomial distribution, p < 0.05). Gorillas did not perform 
above chance on single invisible controls (binomial distribution, p > 0.05). Control trials 
for sequential and alternate invisible displacements could not be conducted because of a 
lack of subject motivation to participate. 
     Gorillas did not perform above chance on the double invisible displacement task 
(binomial distribution, p > 0.05). This task was divided into adjacent and non-adjacent 
trials. Gorillas performed above chance on adjacent (binomial distribution, p < 0.05), but 
not on non-adjacent (binomial distribution, p > 0.05) double invisible displacements. 
Gorillas did not perform above chance on double invisible controls (binomial 
distribution, p > 0.05). 
     Please refer to Table 7 for a summary of gorilla performance on invisible 
displacement tasks in Phase I.  
     I also calculated the percentages of the different types of errors and successes in 
adjacent and non-adjacent double invisible displacement trials (see Table 8). However, 


























Regular         
  
      
  Single 2 7 9 77.8 Yes -- Yes 
  Sequential 2 10 15 66.7 Yes -- Yes 
  Alternate 2 14 28 50 Yes -- Yes 
  Double 2 19 36 52.8 No -- No 
  Double 
adjacent 
2 13 17 76.5 Yes -- Yes 
  Double non-
adjacent 
2 6 19 31.6 No -- No 
Control         
  
     
  Single 2 5 11 45.5 No -- No 
  Double 2 4 12 33.3 No -- No 
 
Note. Dashes indicate that it was not necessary to check whether subjects were using the strategy of “randomly choosing between the 
two boxes visited by the experimenter,” because it was either not applicable (that is, for single, sequential, alternate, and double 






Table 7 (continued) 
 
a 
 A “yes” in this column means that the actual number of correct choices made by the subjects was significantly greater than the 
number expected if the subjects were randomly choosing one box out of three (the probability of succeeding by doing this is 0.33), 
according to the binomial distribution (alpha = 0.05). This applies for all tasks, except for double invisible displacements (including 
adjacent, non-adjacent, and control trials), in which case, probability of chance success is 0.5. 
 
b A “yes” in this column means that the subjects were not using the strategy of “randomly choosing between the two boxes visited by 
the experimenter.” The number of choices to the baited box was significantly greater than the number of choices to the non-baited 
visited box, according to the binomial distribution (alpha = 0.05).  
 
c A “yes” in this column means that all possible strategies have been eliminated. This varies from task to task. A “no” means that 
subjects either did not perform above chance, or performed above chance, but did not distinguish between the two visited boxes. 
Please refer to the Data Analysis section in Chapter 2 for more details.
 63 
Table 8. Mean Percentage of First- and Second-Choice Successes and Errors for Gorillas  
              in Double Invisible Displacements in Phase I. 
 
 
First choice Second choice 
Type of 
displacement Success Error Success Error 
Adjacent 60.7 10 17.2 12.2 
Non-adjacent 27.9 63.7 0 8.3 
 
      
Phase II 
     Only regular double invisible displacements were administered in this phase. Gorillas 
did not perform above chance on the double invisible displacement task (binomial 
distribution, p > 0.05). This task was divided into adjacent and non-adjacent trials. 
Gorillas performed above chance on adjacent (binomial distribution, p < 0.05), but not on 
non-adjacent (binomial distribution, p > 0.05) double invisible displacements. Please 
refer to Table 9 for a summary of gorilla performance in Phase II. 
 













Invisible         
  
  
  Double 2 29 48 60.4 No 
  Double 
adjacent 
2 19 19 100 Yes 
  Double non-
adjacent 
2 10 29 34.5 No 
 
a 
 A “yes” in this column means that the actual number of correct choices made by the 
subjects was significantly greater than the number expected if the subjects were randomly 
choosing the correct box out of three (the probability of succeeding by doing this is 0.5), 
according to the binomial distribution (alpha = 0.05). Please refer to the Data Analysis 
section in Chapter 2 for more details.  
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     I also calculated the percentages of the different types of errors and successes in 
adjacent and non-adjacent double invisible displacement trials (see Table 10). However, 
since there were only two gorillas, I did not run any statistical analyses on the data.  
 
Table 10. Mean Percentage of First- and Second-Choice Successes and Errors for   
                Gorillas in Double Invisible Displacements in Phase II. 
 
 
First choice Second choice 
Type of 
displacement Success Error Success Error 
Adjacent 83.9 0 16.1 0 





     Gorillas passed all regular tasks that required a single displacement (i.e., single, 
sequential, and alternate visible and invisible tasks). These results replicated those of 
previous researchers who studied apes (Barth & Call, 2006; Call, 2001; Collier-Baker et 
al., 2006; de Blois et al., 1998). However, as discussed previously, regular tasks can be 
solved by the use of the strategy “search in the box visited by the experimenter,” and 
thus, control tasks (in which the empty displacer is moved into a second box, after the 
reward is left in the first box visited) need to be administered and analyzed. In the present 
study, I was able to administer controls for two single displacement tasks-- single visible 
and invisible.11 A complete analysis showed that subjects could solve single visible, but 
not invisible, controls. The finding that subjects could not solve single invisible controls 
                                                 
11
 I was not able to conduct controls for sequential and alternate visible and invisible tasks because of a lack 
of subject motivation. 
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differs from that of previous research with other apes, which has found that orangutans 
(de Blois et al., 1998) and chimpanzees (Collier-Baker et al., 2006) can solve single 
invisible displacement controls (these are the only single displacement controls that apes 
have been tested on; gorillas have not been tested on single controls previously). This 
discrepancy could be a result of species differences, or could be an artifact of the low 
sample size in this study (I was able to test only two gorillas). Thus, more studies with 
suitable controls and complete analyses need to be conducted before any final 
conclusions can be drawn about this species’ performance on single displacement tasks.  
     Gorillas in the present study failed the double visible displacement regular task 
because they were not distinguishing between the two boxes visited by the experimenter. 
When this task was divided into adjacent and non-adjacent trials, gorillas were found to 
fail both (and in non-adjacent trials, they were not distinguishing between the two boxes 
visited). Gorillas also failed double visible displacement controls. These findings differ 
from those of previous researchers who studied orangutans (Call, 2001; de Blois et al., 
1998); however, these researchers did not check to see if their subjects were 
distinguishing between the two boxes visited in the regular trials (gorillas have not been 
tested on the double visible displacement task previously). The discrepancy could also be 
a result of species differences, or could be an artifact of the low sample size in this study. 
Thus, more studies with suitable controls and complete analyses need to be conducted 
before any final conclusions can be drawn about this species’ performance on double 
visible displacement tasks. 
 66 
     Gorillas failed the double invisible displacement regular task in the present study.12 
This task was divided into adjacent and non-adjacent trials, and gorillas were found to 
solve adjacent, but not non-adjacent trials. These findings replicate those of previous 
researchers who studied apes (Barth & Call, 2006; Call, 2001; Collier-Baker & 
Suddendorf, 2006; de Blois et al., 1998). Gorillas did not make a greater percentage of 
second-choice errors in non-adjacent compared to adjacent trials (in fact, they made a 
slightly smaller percentage of errors). However, as with the orangutans in this study, 
whenever the gorillas did get a second chance on non-adjacent trials, they always (100% 
of the time) chose the unbaited center box that was never visited by the experimenter. 
Also, as with the orangutans, gorillas made a greater percentage of first-choice errors in 
non-adjacent trials (64%, as opposed to 10% on adjacent trials), although it could not be 
determined whether or not this difference was statistically significant, because of a low 
sample size. Thus, it appears that both first and second-choice errors contributed to the 
overall failure in the non-adjacent double invisible displacement trials for gorillas too 
(see Table 8).  
     Finally, I want to draw attention to the fact that gorillas in this study passed adjacent 
trials in double invisible displacement tasks, while failing adjacent double visible regular 
trials. This may seem surprising, given the assumption by previous researchers that 
double invisible displacement tasks are more difficult to solve than any other task. 
However, post-hoc analysis indicates that for the adjacent trials in the double visible task, 
subjects were not distinguishing between the two boxes visited by the experimenter, and 
for this task, subjects were given only one choice per trial. In the adjacent double 
invisible displacements, however, subjects were given two choices, and the fact that they 
                                                 
12
 Gorillas also failed double invisible displacement control trials.  
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passed these trials means that they were choosing among the two boxes visited by the 
experimenter. Thus, they might be succeeding in the adjacent double invisible 
displacement trials by using the strategy of “randomly choosing between the two visited 
boxes”; the fact that they were given two choices was an advantage. One can hypothesize 
that if subjects were given a second choice in the double visible task, they might have 
passed adjacent trials there as well.  
     Taken together, these results indicate that gorillas in this study could not solve visible 
and invisible displacement tasks in Phase I. However, given the low sample size, further 
research is required before any final conclusions can be drawn about the species’ ability 




     Gorillas failed the double invisible displacement regular task in Phase II. When this 
task was divided into adjacent and non-adjacent trials, gorillas were found to solve the 
former, but not the latter. As hypothesized in Phase I, subject could have passed the 
adjacent trials in Phase II simply because they were given two choices.  
     Gorillas made a greater percentage of second-choice errors in non-adjacent compared 
to adjacent trials (in fact, they did not make any second-choice errors in the adjacent 
trials). As in Phase I, whenever the gorillas were given a second chance in non-adjacent 
trials, they always (100% of the time) chose the unbaited center box that was never 
visited by the experimenter. Also, as in Phase I, gorillas made a greater percentage of 
first-choice errors in non-adjacent trials (in fact, they did not make any first-choice errors 
in the adjacent trials). Thus, it appears that both first and second-choice errors contributed 
to the overall failure in the non-adjacent double invisible displacement trials in Phase II 
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as well (see Table 10). As with the orangutans in this study, presenting the boxes in 
locomotive space for gorillas did not reduce the tendency to search in a location that was 
not visited by the experimenter. Further research is required to resolve the question of 





























     The lemurs had to be trained to point with their noses using a basic shaping procedure. 
On average, it took three 15 minute sessions to train each lemur to unambiguously point 




Visible Displacement Tasks 
     Lemurs performed above chance on single, sequential, and alternate visible 
displacement regular tasks (binomial distribution, p < 0.05). Lemurs also performed 
above chance on sequential visible displacement controls (binomial distribution, 
p < 0.05). However, further analysis showed that there was no significant difference 
between the number of choices to the baited box and the number of choices to the 
unbaited visited box on sequential visible controls (binomial distribution, p > 0.05). 
Lemurs did not perform above chance on single and alternate visible displacement 
controls (binomial distribution, p > 0.05). Furthermore, post-hoc analysis showed that 
that there was no significant difference between the number of choices to the baited box 
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and the number of choices to the unbaited visited box on single and alternate visible 
controls (binomial distribution, p > 0.05). 
 
     Lemurs performed above chance on the double visible displacement regular task 
overall, and on both adjacent and non-adjacent trials (binomial distribution, p < 0.05), 
and further analysis showed that that there was a significant difference between the 
number of choices to the baited box and the number of choices to the unbaited visited box 
on all these displacements (binomial distribution, p < 0.05). Lemurs also performed 
above chance on double visible displacement controls (binomial distribution, p < 0.05). 
     Please refer to Table 11 for a summary of lemur performance on visible displacement 
































Regular                 
  Single 5 23 30 76.7 Yes -- Yes 
  Sequential 5 26 32 81.3 Yes -- Yes 
  Alternate 5 51 62 82.3 Yes -- Yes 
  Double 5 31 44 70.5 Yes Yes Yes 
  Double 
adjacent 
5 16 22 72.7 Yes Yes Yes 
  Double non- 
adjacent 
5 15 22 68.2 Yes Yes Yes 
Control         
  
     
  Single 5 10 20 50 No Nod No 
  Sequential 2 9 15 60 Yes No No 
  Alternate 3 9 24 37.5 No Nod No 
  Double 5 17 34 50 Yes -- Yes 
 
Note. Dashes indicate that it was not necessary to check whether subjects were using the strategy of “randomly choosing between the 
two boxes visited by the experimenter,” because it was not applicable (that is, for single, sequential, and alternate regular trials, and 






Table 11 (continued) 
 
a 
 A “yes” in this column means that the actual number of correct choices made by the subjects was significantly greater than the 
number expected if the subjects were randomly choosing one box out of three (the probability of succeeding by doing this is 0.33), 
according to the binomial distribution (alpha = 0.05).  
 
b A “yes” in this column means that the subjects were not using the strategy of “randomly choosing between the two boxes visited by 
the experimenter.” The number of choices to the baited box was significantly greater than the number of choices to the non-baited 
visited box, according to the binomial distribution (alpha = 0.05).  
 
c A “yes” in this column means that all possible strategies have been eliminated. This varies from task to task. A “no” means that 
subjects either did not perform above chance, or performed above chance, but did not distinguish between the two visited boxes. 
Please refer to the Data Analysis section in Chapter 2 for more details.  
 
d Post-hoc analyses showed that subjects were not distinguishing between the two boxes visited by the experimenter in single and 
alternate controls.  
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Invisible Displacement Tasks 
     Lemurs performed above chance on single, sequential, and alternate invisible 
displacement regular tasks (binomial distribution, p < 0.05). Lemurs also performed 
above chance on single invisible displacement controls (binomial distribution, 
p < 0.05). Further analysis showed that there was a significant difference between the 
number of choices to the baited box and the number of choices to the unbaited visited box 
on single invisible controls (binomial distribution, p < 0.05). Lemurs did not perform 
above chance on alternate and sequential invisible displacement controls (binomial 
distribution, p > 0.05). Furthermore, post-hoc analysis showed that that there was no 
significant difference between the number of choices to the baited box and the number of 
choices to the unbaited visited box on alternate and sequential invisible controls 
(binomial distribution, p > 0.05). 
      Lemurs did not perform above chance on the double invisible displacement regular 
task (binomial distribution, p > 0.05). This task was divided into adjacent and non-
adjacent trials. Lemurs performed above chance on adjacent (binomial distribution, p < 
0.05), but not on non-adjacent (binomial distribution, p > 0.05) double invisible 
displacements. Lemurs did not perform above chance on double invisible controls 
(binomial distribution, p > 0.05). 
     Please refer to Table 12 for a summary of lemur performance on invisible 




























Regular         
  
      
  Single 5 20 26 76.9 Yes -- Yes 
  Sequential 5 27 31 87.1 Yes -- Yes 
  Alternate 5 41 51 80.4 Yes -- Yes 
  Double 5 23 39 58.9 No -- No 
  Double adjacent 5 15 20 75 Yes -- Yes 
  Double non- 
adjacent 
5 8 19 42.1 No -- No 
Control         
  
     
  Single 5 19 27 70.4 Yes Yes Yes 
  Sequential 2 4 8 50 No Nod No 
  Alternate 3 10 23 43.5 No Nod No 
  Double 5 3 20 15 No -- No 
 
Note. Dashes indicate that it was not necessary to check whether subjects were using the strategy of “randomly choosing between the 
two boxes visited by the experimenter,” because it was not applicable (that is, for single, sequential, alternate, and double invisible 
regular trials, and double invisible controls). 
 
a 
 A “yes” in this column means that the actual number of correct choices made by the subjects was significantly greater than the 
number expected if the subjects were randomly choosing one box out of three (the probability of succeeding by doing this is 0.33), 
according to the binomial distribution (alpha = 0.05). This applies for all tasks, except for double invisible displacements, in which 
case, probability of chance success is 0.5. 
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Table 12 (continued) 
 
b A “yes” in this column means that the subjects were not using the strategy of “randomly choosing between the two boxes visited by 
the experimenter.” The number of choices to the baited box was significantly greater than the number of choices to the non-baited 
visited box, according to the binomial distribution (alpha = 0.05).  
 
c A “yes” in this column means that all possible strategies have been eliminated. This varies from task to task. A “no” means that 
subjects either did not perform above chance, or performed above chance, but did not distinguish between the two visited boxes. 
Please refer to the Data Analysis section in Chapter 2 for more details.  
 
d Post-hoc analyses showed that subjects were not distinguishing between the two boxes visited by the experimenter in sequential and 
alternate controls.  
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     I also calculated the percentages of the different types of errors and successes in 
adjacent and non-adjacent double invisible displacement trials (see Table 13). The sample 
size was too low to run a Wilcoxon signed ranks exact test to compare the percentage of 
second-choice errors in adjacent and non-adjacent trials. Post-hoc analysis showed that 
there was no significant difference between the percentage of first-choice errors in non-




Table 13. Mean Percentage of First- and Second-Choice Successes and Errors for Black- 
                and-White Ruffed Lemurs in Double Invisible Displacements in Phase I. 
 
 
First choice Second choice 
Type of 
displacement Success Error Success Error 
Adjacent 59.3 14 18.7 8 




     Black-and-white ruffed lemurs as a group passed all regular tasks that required a 
single displacement (i.e., single, sequential, and alternate visible tasks, as well as single, 
sequential, and alternate invisible tasks). Recent research has found that other lemur 
species (red-fronted brown lemurs, mongoose lemurs, ring-tailed lemurs, and gentle 
bamboo lemurs) passed single visible regular tasks, but failed single invisible regular 
tasks (Deppe, Wright, & Szelistowski, 2009; it should be noted that all these species were 
combined into a single group during data analysis). However, as discussed previously, 
regular tasks can be solved by the use of the strategy “search in the box visited by the 
experimenter,” and thus, control tasks need to be administered. My study found that 
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except for the single invisible displacement control task, lemurs failed all other controls 
for single displacements (i.e., single, sequential, and alternate visible controls, and 
sequential and alternate invisible controls). The failure was because the subjects were not 
distinguishing between the two boxes visited by the experimenter. 
     Black-and-white ruffed lemurs passed double visible displacement regular and control 
trials.13 However, there was some imbalance in the double visible controls that I 
administered, in that the center box happened to be the baited box in a much larger 
number of trials than the terminal boxes. This was because the box to be baited was 
randomly pre-determined, and if subjects stopped participating after sometime, they 
might not have received all the trials in which the terminal boxes were supposed to be 
baited. A closer look at performance on double visible controls reveals that subjects 
performed very well on trials in which the center box was baited (subjects passed 14 out 
of 18 trials), but did not do so well on trials in which terminal boxes were baited (subjects 
passed only 3 out of 16 trials), which shows some limitations in their understanding of 
this task. Along with the finding that subjects failed most controls for single 
displacements, this casts some doubt on whether black-and-white ruffed lemurs in this 
study truly understood visible displacements. 
     Deppe et al. (2009) found that the various species of lemurs in their study succeeded 
on double visible displacement regular and control trials. However, they did not check to 
see if their subjects were distinguishing between the two boxes visited by the 
experimenter in the regular trials. Thus, we cannot rule out the possibility that subjects in 
                                                 
13
 When the double visible displacement regular task was divided into adjacent and non-adjacent trials, 
lemurs were found to pass both. 
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their study were using the strategy of “randomly choose between the two boxes visited” 
to solve double visible regular trials.  
     Lemurs as a group failed the double invisible displacement regular task in the present 
study,14 as in Deppe et al. (2009). When this task was divided into adjacent and non-
adjacent trials, lemurs were found to solve the former, but not the latter. Since subjects 
were not distinguishing between the two boxes visited by the experimenter in single 
displacement controls, they might be passing adjacent trials in double invisible 
displacements by using the strategy of “randomly choosing between the two visited 
boxes”; the fact that they were given two choices was an advantage. One can hypothesize 
that if subjects were given a second choice in the single displacement controls, they 
might have passed those as well. 
      In the double invisible displacement task, lemurs did not make a greater percentage of 
second-choice errors in non-adjacent compared to adjacent trials (in fact, they made a 
slightly smaller percentage of errors). However, as with the orangutans and gorillas in 
this study, whenever the lemurs did get a second chance on non-adjacent trials, they 
always (100% of the time) chose the unbaited center box that was never visited by the 
experimenter. Also, as with the orangutans and gorillas in this study, lemurs made a 
greater percentage of first-choice errors in non-adjacent trials, when compared to 
adjacent trials, although post-hoc analysis showed that this difference was not statistically 
significant. Thus, it appears that both first and second-choice errors contributed to the 
overall failure in the non-adjacent double invisible displacement trials for lemurs too (see 
Table 13).  
                                                 
14
 Lemurs also failed double invisible displacement control trials.  
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     Taken together, these results indicate that black-and-white ruffed lemurs cannot solve 
tasks in the test battery of Phase I. Subjects could not be tested in Phase II because their 

















































     One of the goals of this dissertation was to test different primate species on all tasks in 
the traditional object permanence test battery, using controls for every task in the battery. 
A literature review reveals that very few studies of object permanence in non-human 
primates have been conducted using appropriate controls. The present study was the first 
to conduct control trials for all tasks in the battery, and is thus a more thorough 
evaluation of object permanence in the species under study.  
     Another goal of this dissertation was to try and ensure that no simple search strategies 
could account for success in solving the tasks in the traditional test battery. Some 
previous studies have controlled for strategies such as “search in the last box visited by 
the experimenter” and “search in the first box visited by the experimenter.” While the 
present study also controlled for these strategies, I found that subjects could appear to 
succeed15 on some tasks in which there are two displacements (i.e., single, sequential, and 
alternate visible and invisible controls, as well as double visible regular trials) by using 
the strategy of “randomly choosing between the two boxes visited by the experimenter.” 
Whether they are using this strategy or not can be revealed by comparing the number of 
choices to the baited box with the number of choices to the non-baited visited box. If 
there is no significant difference, then it can be concluded that subjects have failed the 
task because they are not distinguishing between the two boxes visited by the 
                                                 
15
 Success is defined as “performing above chance,” which means that the actual number of correct choices 
made by the subjects was significantly greater than the number expected if the subjects were randomly 
choosing one box out of three (the probability of succeeding by doing this is 0.33). 
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experimenter. Incidentally, if subjects are not performing above chance on the 
aforementioned tasks, post-hoc analyses might reveal that the reason for failure was that 
they were not distinguishing between the two boxes visited by the experimenter.  
     Having administered all tasks with suitable controls, I found that orangutans were the 
only species that reliably passed most visible and invisible displacement tasks in the 
traditional object permanence test battery. Since the possible use of all known strategies 
was eliminated with the analysis of the visible displacement tasks, it can be concluded 
that orangutans understand that an object continues to exist even when it is not perceived, 
and are capable of tracking successive visible displacements, but with some limitations in 
non-adjacent displacements. It can thus be concluded that orangutans are capable of 
representing the unperceived trajectory of an object, but with some limitations because 
they failed non-adjacent and control trials in double invisible displacements. These 
findings are similar to those from previous object permanence research with orangutans 
(Barth & Call, 2006; Call 2001; de Blois et al., 1998), and add further confirmation to 
previous conclusions on object permanence in orangutans, because I conducted a 
complete analysis to ensure that the subjects were indeed distinguishing between the two 
boxes visited by the experimenter in tasks requiring two displacements. 
     In contrast, the possible use of all known strategies could not be eliminated when 
analyzing the data on gorillas and black-and-white ruffed lemurs in the present study. 
Both species failed some tasks because they were not distinguishing between the two 
boxes visited by the experimenter (gorillas failed the double visible task, and lemurs 
failed most single displacement controls in this way), and thus, both species’ apparent 
success on the adjacent trials in double invisible displacements was called into question. 
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Both species also failed non-adjacent and control trials in double invisible displacements. 
While more studies need to be conducted with gorillas (since this study could only test 
two individuals), it can be concluded that black-and-white ruffed lemurs lack the ability 
to represent unperceived objects and object movements. Furthermore, the finding that 
subjects used the strategy of “randomly choosing between the two boxes visited” in some 
tasks warrants a re-evaluation of object permanence in all species studied to date. Future 
studies of object permanence should test for this strategy as well. 
     Finally, it appeared that both first and second-choice errors16 contributed to the overall 
failure in the non-adjacent double invisible displacement trials for all three species in the 
present study. The presence of both of these errors is indicative of the inherent difficulty 
of non-adjacent trials. The presence of second-choice errors, specifically, lends support to 
Call’s (2001) response-bias inhibition hypothesis, which states that primates have a bias 
towards searching in a sequence, with an inability to inhibit choosing the center box in 
non-adjacent trials. In particular, whenever my subjects received a second chance, after 
having chosen a relevant box on their first choice, they always (100% of the time) chose 
the unbaited center box that was never visited by the experimenter. This was the case for 
all species under study.  
     In sum, results from this dissertation indicate that orangutans were the only species 
under study with an ability to represent unperceived objects and an ability to represent 
unperceived object movements. This is surprising, given the previously stated hypotheses 
that the former ability might have evolved in species that forage for plant food that 
                                                 
16
 First-choice errors occur if a subject chooses a non-baited, non-visited box on the first attempt. Second-
choice errors occur if a subject chooses the visited, non-baited box on the first attempt, and the non-visited 
box on the second attempt. 
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remains at a certain location even when it is not perceived, and the latter ability might 
have evolved in species that need to track group members. Orangutans, gorillas, and 
black-and-white ruffed lemurs forage for this kind of plant food, and all three species live 
in social groups. Thus, the finding that orangutans were the only species with an ability to 
represent unperceived objects and object movements calls these hypotheses into question. 
Taking a closer look at each species’ ecology (Table 14) might give us a better 

















Table 14. Brief ecological comparison of Sumatran orangutans, Western lowland gorillas, and black-and-white ruffed lemurs. 
 
Sumatran orangutans Western lowland gorillas 
Black-and-white  
ruffed lemurs 
Foraging for stationary plant foods that remain  
at a given location even when they are not perceived 
Yes 
 
(MacKinnon, 1974; Maple, 1980) 
Yes 
 




Extractive foraging  
 
Yes, to some extent 
 
(Gibson, 1986; Parker & Gibson, 
1979; van Schaik, Fox, & Sitompul 
1996) 
Minimal (extract pith, tubers) 
 
(Gibson, 1986; Parker & Gibson, 
1979; Tomasello & Call, 1997) 
None reported 
Living in social groups and having to keep track  
of moving group members 
Yes, to some extent 
 
(Cawthon Lang, 2005) 
Yes 
 




Needing to keep track of mobile predators Yes, to some extent 
 
(Cawthon Lang, 2005) 
Possibly leopards 
 




Consuming mobile prey (eg: ants, termites) Minor component of diet 
 
(MacKinnon, 1974; Maple, 1980) 
Minor component of diet 
 





     As discussed previously, it has been hypothesized that the ability to represent 
unperceived objects might have evolved within the context of foraging, including 
extractive foraging (Tomasello & Call, 1997). As can be seen from Table 14, all three 
species under study forage for plant foods that remain at a given location. However, out 
of the three species, only orangutans and gorillas can be considered to be extractive 
foragers. Specifically, orangutans extract pith and tubers (Gibson, 1986; Parker & 
Gibson, 1979) and have been observed to use sticks to extract seeds out of fruit husks and 
probe for insects in the wild (van Schaik et al., 1996). Gorillas also extract pith and tubers 
in the wild (Doran et al., 2002; Gibson, 1986; Parker & Gibson, 1979), although to a 
lesser degree. In contrast, black-and-white ruffed lemurs are not considered to be 
extractive foragers. Since extractive foraging requires extracting a food that is not 
directly perceptible, it has been hypothesized that extractive foragers might have evolved 
the ability to mentally represent unperceived objects (Tomasello & Call, 1997). Given the 
finding of this study that orangutans (and not black-and-white ruffed lemurs) have the 
ability to represent unperceived objects, I believe that it is extractive foraging (and not 
general foraging) that is the major factor in the evolution of this ability.  
     I believe that the finding that the gorillas in this study could not represent unperceived 
objects, is an artifact of the low sample size (both in terms of the number of subjects, and 
the number of trials per task), and that further research with a larger sample size will 
yield more positive results. This might be possible even though gorillas do not 
extensively engage in extractive foraging in the wild, because it has been hypothesized 
that humans and great apes had a common omnivorous, tool-using ancestor, who engaged 
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in extractive foraging, and gorillas later radiated into a niche that did not require the use 
of tools and a high degree of extractive foraging (Gibson, 1986; Parker & Gibson, 1979).  
     Since this study found that black-and-white ruffed lemurs cannot represent 
unperceived objects, it is not expected that they can represent unperceived object 
movements. Thus, the following discussion will focus on possible reasons for why 
orangutans are able to represent unperceived object movements, and reasons for why we 
might expect gorillas to have the same ability. It has been hypothesized that this ability 
might have evolved in species that need to track mobile prey, predators, or group 
members (Tomasello & Call, 1997). As can be seen from Table 14, both gorillas and 
orangutans live in groups: western lowland gorillas live in groups of 10-20 individuals in 
the wild (Doran & McNeilage, 2001), whereas orangutans in the wild interact socially 
during breeding and when taking care of offspring (MacKinnon, 1974; Maple, 1980). 
Orangutans are subject to occasional predation by tigers (Cawthon Lang, 2005), and 
leopards are possible predators of gorillas (Fay, Carroll, Kerbis Peterhans, & Harris, 
1995). Both species also feed on mobile prey, specifically termites and ants, although 
these do not comprise a major portion of their diet (MacKinnon, 1974; Maple, 1980, 
1982; Doran et al., 2002).  
     Since neither species seems to be under strong predation pressure, and neither species 
consumes a large amount of mobile prey, it would be reasonable to accept Tomasello and 
Call’s (1997) hypothesis that apes’ ability to represent unperceived object movements 
might have evolved mainly in the context of tracking group members. As before, I 
believe that the finding that gorillas in this study could not represent unperceived object 
movements is an artifact of the low sample size. A question might arise about why this 
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ability did not evolve in black-and-white ruffed lemurs, which also live in groups. 
However, it must be noted that a particular demand might not necessarily lead to the 




     In Phase II, tasks were presented to gorillas and orangutans in a locomotive space, to 
see if they could solve non-adjacent double invisible displacement trials (this is the first 
study to present these tests in a locomotive space to non-human primate species). Call 
(2001) hypothesized that arranging the boxes close together in space, as in the traditional 
test battery, might be causing the response bias of searching in a sequence, with an 
inability to inhibit choosing the center box. He suggested presenting tasks in a locomotive 
(not a small-scale) space, because having to move from one location to another might 
introduce costs associated with traveling and may reduce the tendency to search in 
locations that have not been visited by the experimenter (that is, the center box).  
     However, orangutans and gorillas in this study did not pass non-adjacent trials, even 
when tasks were presented in locomotive space. The pattern of the different types of 
errors and successes in Phase II was very similar to that in Phase I. As in Phase I, it 
appeared that both first and second-choice errors contributed to the overall failure in the 
non-adjacent double invisible displacement trials. Thus, presenting the boxes in 
locomotive space did not reduce the tendency to search in a location that was not visited 
by the experimenter. This is the first study to present this task to non-human primate 
species in locomotive space. Further research is required to resolve the question of 
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whether this performance limitation is a result of the manner in which the tasks were 
presented.      
     Apart from suggesting task presentation in locomotive space, Call (2001) also 
suggested that a non-linear arrangement of the boxes might remove apes’ tendency to 
search in a sequence, with an inability to inhibit choosing the center box. To my 
knowledge, the only researchers to have implemented this methodological change are 
Collier-Baker and Suddendorf (2006). In a study of double invisible displacements, these 
researchers presented four boxes in a non-linear diamond-shaped array on a vertical plane 
to two chimpanzees (see Figure 4). The diamond-shaped array prevented the subjects 
from simply searching in a sequence, because the boxes were no longer in a row. The 
boxes were presented on a vertical plane so that all boxes were within reach of the 
subjects (and all boxes were equidistant to the subjects). They claimed that the 
chimpanzees successfully solved non-adjacent double invisible displacements (along with 
suitable control trials), and concluded that poor performance in previous studies might 
have been because of a search bias or inhibition problem caused by a linear array, and not 
because of the species’ inability to solve this task. However, the displacements were not 
truly non-adjacent because they did not involve the experimenter skipping a box, as in the 
traditional linear arrangement, and thus their conclusion is invalid (their adjacent 
displacement consisted of, for example, visiting boxes A and B in sequence; their non-
adjacent displacement consisted of visiting boxes D and B in sequence, the movement 





     Figure 4. Depiction of diamond-shaped array. 
 
     I believe that a non-linear arrangement in which the experimenter skips a box is 
required to resolve the question of whether apes can truly solve non-adjacent 
displacements. I suggest presenting three boxes in a triangle-shaped array on a vertical 
plane (see Figure 5). The triangle should be equilateral so that the three boxes are 
equidistant from one another. An example of a non-adjacent displacement would be to 
move the displacer into box C, bring it out, move it over box A, and then moving it into 
box B (the reward could be hidden in either C or B). Using three boxes in this manner 
will yield results that can be directly compared with results from non-adjacent 
displacements in the traditional linear array (with three boxes in a row). With a triangle-
shaped array, there will be no question of the subjects simply searching in a sequence, 





Figure 5. Depiction of triangle-shaped array. 
 
Future Directions with the Traditional Paradigm 
      As has been repeatedly pointed out throughout this dissertation, there has been no 
uniformity in tasks that have been used to study object permanence in non-human 
primates. Not all studies have used all the tasks in the test battery, not all studies have 
used appropriate controls, and not all studies have used controls for each and every task 
in the battery. All of this inconsistency makes it very difficult to make valid species 
comparisons, or even to make valid within-species assessments. Furthermore, not all 
researchers will be able to use the sheer number of tasks in the battery for various 
reasons, including a lack of subject motivation to participate in so many tasks. For 
species that have never been subject to object permanence studies, control tasks in the 
battery (single, sequential, alternate visible and invisible) can first be administered to 
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check whether they understand that objects continue to exist even when they are not 
perceived. If species have demonstrated this understanding, I suggest that the following 
two tasks are adequate to test for an ability to track a visibly moving object and an ability 
to represent the unperceived trajectory of an object: 
1. Double visible displacement. After the reward is placed in a transparent displacer, the 
displacer is successively moved into two of the three boxes, and the reward is left in one 
of the two visited boxes. The two boxes visited, the order in which they are visited, the 
initial and final positions of the displacer, and whether the reward is left in the first or 
second box visited, should all be randomized.  
     The analysis of the task should include a check to see if the subjects are distinguishing 
between the two boxes visited by the experimenter. This task, with the complete analysis, 
will thus control for all the three known strategies,17 and so a separate control task is not 
required. Thus, it is a decisive test for visible displacements. Adjacent and non-adjacent 
trials can then be separately analyzed to see if there is any difference in the pattern of 
choices. In fact, adjacent and non-adjacent trials should be administered in separate 
blocks, one after the other. This is because if subjects have difficulty with non-adjacent 
trials, as has been found in the present study, interspersing them with adjacent trials 
might disrupt performance on the latter. 
2. Double invisible displacement. This is similar to the task described above, except that 
an opaque displacer is used instead of a transparent displacer, and a second choice is 
given if the subject first chooses the unbaited visited box. This task will control for the 
strategies of “search in the first box visited by the experimenter” and “search in the last 
                                                 
17
 The three known strategies are: “search in the first box visited by the experimenter,” “search in the last 
box visited by the experimenter,” and “randomly choose between the two boxes visited by the 
experimenter.” 
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box visited by the experimenter.” However, we cannot truly conclude that subjects passed 
the double invisible displacement task, unless the same subjects also passed the double 
visible displacement task without the use of the three known strategies. Adjacent and 
non-adjacent trials can be administered in separate blocks.  
     Success on the double visible displacement task can be taken as evidence of an 
understanding that an object exists even when it is not perceived, and as evidence of an 
ability to track a visibly moving object. Success on both the visible and the invisible 
displacement tasks can be taken as evidence of an ability to represent the unperceived 
trajectory of an object.  
     Another line of research that is worth pursuing is whether individuals can learn to 
solve these tasks after training, if they fail during initial experiments. Previous 
researchers of object permanence have not looked at whether individuals can learn to 
solve tasks after training; in fact, they used a low number of trials to avoid the possibility 
of learning during the experiments. However, I believe that if subjects can solve visible 
and invisible tasks after training, it can be taken as evidence of object permanence. These 
training sessions can be conducted using a computerized testing system with a touch 
screen and an automated feeder for delivering reinforcers for correct responses. Such a 
system would eliminate auditory and visual cues that are inherent in traditional object 
permanence tasks, give the researcher an easy way to administer a large number of trials 
over a relatively short span of time, and allow a greater degree of flexibility in designing 
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